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Randomness is an invaluable resource in today’s life with a broad use reaching from
numerical simulations through randomized algorithms to cryptography. However,
on the classical level no true randomness is available and even the use of simple
quantum devices in a prepare-measure setting suffers from lack of stability and con-
trollability. This gave rise to a group of quantum protocols that provide randomness
certified by classical statistical tests – Device Independent Quantum Random Num-
ber Generators. In this paper we review the most relevant results in this field, which
allow the production of almost perfect randomness with help of quantum devices,
supplemented with an arbitrary weak source of additional randomness. This is in
fact the best one could hope for to achieve, as with no starting randomness (corre-
sponding to no free will in a different concept) even a quantum world would have a
fully deterministic description.
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1 Introduction
Randomness is one of the key concepts of modern science, finding many applications
in both hard and soft sciences. At the same time, it is a very controversial topic. This
fruitful controversy comes from the fact that the notion of “randomness” is not universally
and uniquely defined and in different fields of science can mean different things. In fact,
it is even not clear whether randomness shall be considered as an objective fact. In such
a case there shall exist fundamentally unpredictable processes in nature, which, if used
correctly, could serve as perfect randomness generators.
The other approach says that randomness as such is only a subjective concept rep-
resenting incomplete knowledge about a process or system. In this approach no perfect
randomness and randomness generators exist. However it still makes sense to speak about
randomness perceived by a given observer – even a perfectly deterministic process can
be seen as perfectly random by an observer not having access to underlying information
about the process.
In spite of this ambiguity, randomness has been shown to be an important resource
with a variety of applications such as statistical sampling, numerical simulations, algo-
rithm design [62] and cryptography [57] to name a few.
Random statistical sampling is a common way to avoid bias in deductions in cases
such as marketing polls or clinical trials of drugs. Sample space is here usually taken as
small as possible, as it is directly connected with costs of the survey or the time needed
for clinical test. It is thus crucial to cover homogenously different parameters of the
underlying set with as few instances as possible. Even more, many parameters are not
easily accessible and thus directly disallow proper selecting of the best sample space.
Perfect randomness, if used correctly, was proven to overcome this complications in most
of the common cases.
Numerical simulations of real world phenomena use randomness to predict processes
that are too complicated to be fully simulated. Common example are the weather fore-
casts – as a chaotic phenomenon the reliability of their results exponentially depends on
the preciseness of the starting point and the simulation itself. Perfect randomness helps
to choose sample space for the simulation that brings the best results.
A slightly different example for utilization of randomness are randomized algorithms.
These involve a randomized component in their design and often have better performance
and are easier to develop and analyze in comparison to their deterministic counterparts.
However, the usefulness of randomness is perhaps most evident in the case of cryp-
tography. In order to break the symmetry between legitimate users of cryptographic
protocols and potential adversaries, the legitimate users have to be given some advan-
tage. The advantage is typically modeled as the knowledge of some randomly generated
secret. This is the reason why many cryptographic tasks, such as encryption (both the
private and public key), secret sharing or bit commitment require randomness for each
use.
Typically, in most of the applications an access to a perfect random source – uniformly
distributed bits independent of any other existing data – is assumed. This assumption is
silently hidden in the analysis of the performance of algorithms and protocols – random
number generators are assumed to produce uniform randomness.
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Unfortunately, it turns out to be very difficult to show that given source of random-
ness is sufficiently unpredictable and adding a requirement of uniform distribution of its
outputs given any other existing data seems downright impossible. Consequently, this
fact raises an important question of whether or not weak random sources – non-uniform
random processes only partially independent of other relevant data – can be effectively
used in different applications.
The problems that arise when one is forced to use a weak source of randomness are
well identified and have been extensively studied in classical information processing. It
has been shown that some information processing tasks can be realized reasonably well
with bounded weak sources of randomness [90, 77]. However, many other tasks are
infeasible without an access to an almost perfect random source [55, 30]. Yet again,
cryptography is the best example of how considering the use of weak sources instead
of nearly perfect sources of randomness can change the picture. Already the classical
result of Shannon [81] shows that to obtain perfect secrecy in private key cryptography,
communicating parties have to use perfectly random key. Later it was analyzed whether
at least some amount of secrecy can be salvaged in private key encryption scenario with
weakly random keys. The outcome of this effort was that to guarantee secrecy, one has
to use secret keys that are almost perfectly random [55, 8]. Even in practice, many
security holes in the existing implementations of cryptographic protocols can be traced
back to imperfect random number generators. For example, it has been estimated that
around two out of every thousand RSA moduli used on the Internet are insecure, as they
share a factor with another RSA key [50]. This points to an imperfect random number
generator used for the generation of large prime numbers used as the private key in RSA
encryption.
However, up until recently (see e.g. [11, 42]) there has been little analysis of the
impact of weak randomness in quantum information processing (QIP). This is a surprising
fact, since randomness plays a vital role in a variety of quantum protocols. A possible
reason for this lack of research seems to be the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum
theory, by which randomness is an objective property of each quantum system. The
simplest manifestation of this randomness is a projective measurement of a qubit being
in a perfectly balanced superposition of two canonical basis states. Outcome of such a
measurement is considered as fundamentally undetermined – the outcomes are chosen
at random during the measurement. Therefore perfect randomness is essentially seen
as an ever present and free resource in QIP. In fact this line of thoughts culminated in
commercially available quantum random number generators (QRNG) [1].
In practice, however, perfect randomness cannot be expected even from measurement-
based quantum random number generators. What one can reasonably guarantee is only
a relatively high entropy of the outcomes of QRNG, which then requires post-processing
[83, 35]. Moreover, it has recently been shown that even the state of the art QRNGs do
not pass certain standard statistical tests for randomness [43].
Worse still, the relatively limited weakness of random bits produced by some im-
plementations of QRNGs can become much more severe if the QRNG is deliberately
attacked by an adversary. Such attacks range from changes of the device temperature,
which affects the laser wavelength, leading to biased beam splitters, right through voltage
changes in the electricity input.
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For this reason we have to weaken the assumptions and ask, if the randomness pro-
duction is possible without knowing the precise specification of the quantum devices.
Quantum protocols with unspecified black-box devices are called device independent pro-
tocols.
The problem of device independent randomness production was first studied in a
setting, where the user of the protocol starts with a uniformly distributed string and
uses black-box quantum devices to produce random string as large as possible – hence
the name – device independent randomness expansion[21, 70, 91, 24, 60]. The main idea
behind using black-box devices for randomness expansion is to use random bits as inputs
and collect the outputs of the devices. The fact that input-output statistics violate cer-
tain kind of inequalities – called Bell-type inequalities – can certify that inner workings
of the black-boxes are genuinely quantum and therefore the outcomes are fundamentally
random. We describe here the most relevant results in this area, allowing in the most
elaborated setting an unbounded expansion. We also discuss a slightly stronger limita-
tions for the adversary that allow easier and more efficient production of randomness.
Other group of protocols is devoted to a different version of device independent ran-
domness expansion, often called also randomness amplification[22, 36, 14, 9, 19]. Here
the starting randomness is not provided as a short perfectly random string, but rather as
a source of partially random bits. This source does not provide a uniform distribution,
but their outputs fulfill some criteria given by conditional probability of individual out-
put bits or entropy of the outcome as a whole. Here we also review relevant work in the
area, concluding with a protocol that can amplify any source of randomness (i.e. source
that doesn’t have deterministic outcome), at the cost of unbounded number of devices
used.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second Section we define the notation
and measures of weak random sources and present the results from classical theory. In
the Section 3 we relate Bell inequalities and randomness production. Sections 4 and 5
include the results for randomness expansion and amplification using quantum devices,
concluded with remarks in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
This section serves as a technical introduction for the two main sections of this paper.
We start by formally defining the notion of weak random sources together with a short
history of their most studied types. In Subsection 2.3, randomness extractors – algo-
rithms for post-processing weak random sources into almost perfect ones are introduced.
The last Subsection 2.4 discusses weak random sources in the presence of quantum side
information. Quantum proof extractors are shortly discussed as well.
2.1 Notation
In the rest of this paper random variables are denoted by capital letters (X,Y, Z, . . . ) and
their domain by corresponding calligraphic letters (X ,Y,Z, . . . ). Outcomes of these ran-
dom variables are then denoted by lower case letters (x, y, z, . . . ). Uniform distribution
over s-bit strings is denoted Us. The probability of the random variable X having value
x is denoted Pr[X = x] especially in the introductory part of the paper, later to shorten
the notation we use pX(x) and sometimes, when the random variable in question is clear
from the context we even drop the subscript and use simply p(x). This notation extends
to conditional probabilities and Pr[AB = ab|XY = xy] is often denoted pAV |XY (ab|xy)
and sometimes even p(ab|xy), mainly in the context of randomness production protocols,
which is in accordance with the convention used in the most of the relevant literature on
the topic.
The reader is expected to be familiar with basics of quantum mechanics. If this
is not the case, introductory chapters of any of the well-known textbooks on quantum
information [65, 40] should be consulted.
2.2 Introduction to weak randomness
In this subsection we will first introduce the notion of weak randomness generally and
then proceed to a short review of the most studied types of weak randomness sources.
We will take an operational approach and formally define randomness by random
variables. Because the nature of the randomness bias of the source is typically unknown,
it is insufficient to define a weak source by a random variable X with a given probability
distribution pX . Instead, we model weak randomness by a random variable with unknown
probability distribution. To guarantee at least some randomness we suppose that the
probability distribution pX of the variable X comes from a set S; the level of randomness
is then given by the properties of the set, or more specifically, by the property of the
least random probability distribution(s) in the set.
If we say that a protocol or an algorithm uses randomness from a weak source X
of a given type, we mean that the randomness is distributed according to an arbitrary
(unknown) distribution pX ∈ S. Analysis of a protocol or an algorithm with weak ran-
domness then boils down to proving some desired property in the worst case scenario.
That is finding a set of distributions W ⊆ S, for which the protocol or algorithm mani-
fest the worst case performance, followed by the proof of the desired property with the
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assumption that the randomness is distributed according to a probability distribution
pX ∈ W.
Different types of weak randomness differ in the definition of the set S. The set S
is usually given by a specific property of allowed distributions, often motivated by the
properties of the physical source, but in principle any set of probability distributions can
be seen as a weak randomness source.
Alternative way to arrive at the definition of a weak source X by a set of possible
probability distributions S is to consider another randomness variable E interpreted
as the information the relevant entity has about X. As an example consider a user
running statistical tests to determine the quality of his random number generator. If
the generator passes all the tests, then, according to the users knowledge, the random
variable X describing the outcomes of the generator is very close to uniformly distributed.
However, in most applications the user’s knowledge about the random number generator
is irrelevant. The random number generator output is typically required to be random
against specific entity – examples being the adversary in cryptographic scenarios, or input
data in randomized algorithms. Statistical tests therefore correctly asses the usefulness
of randomness only with an assumption (which is very reasonable most of the time) that
these relevant entities do not have more precise information about the random number
generator than the user.
The notion of weak randomness questions this assumption. In fact, the entities for
whom the random data used in applications needs to be unpredictable are assumed to
have more information about it than the user. This information can be characterized
by a random variable E and the set S that contains distributions pX|E=e for each e.
As the user doesn’t know the concrete piece of information e and therefore the concrete
distribution pX|E=e the source X has from the adversarial point of view, the algorithms
or protocols have to work correctly with all of them. Note that a string can be random
for some entities and completely known for another entities. Therefore, in this view
randomness is not a property of a string, rather is it a subjective property of a process
creating the string. This is in a sharp contrast with algorithmic view of randomness [51],
which can be seen as measure of string’s compressibility.
The view of weak randomness sources as randomness sources with side information
available to the adversary, although nicely illustrating the motivation behind the notion
of weak randomness, is rarely used in the classical (as opposed to quantum) literature
about weak sources. In fact, usually a definition presented before – the adversary knows
the distribution pX ∈ S of X and the user doesn’t – is used in vast majority of the
classical literature. In fact however, these two notions are completely equivalent in
classical world and if one would go through a trouble of rephrasing all the classical
results into the formalism where conditioned probability distributions are used instead
of the unconditioned ones, one would obtain identical results.
The situation gets much more complicated, when one acknowledges the existence of
quantum mechanics. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
randomness is an objective property and there exist genuinely unpredictable events.
Therefore, at least in theory, a device producing objectively random outcomes – i.e.
there exists no information in the Universe that would help us predict them – can be
constructed. However to construct such device we would need perfect control over the
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quantum devices – a feat that is presently not possible. Therefore, in practice our view
of randomness produced by quantum devices is a mixture of two qualitatively different
types of randomness – objective randomness coming from a genuinely unpredictable
quantum process and classical randomness coming from our imprecise implementation
of these quantum processes. Alternatively, quantum random number generators might
leak the information about their outputs after they have been produced, i.e. during the
post processing phase. Another possibility is that the adversary might be a part of the
process producing the outcomes, as in the case of some applications like quantum key
distribution [7, 76]. In the light of this discussion, the view that the adversary might
have more information about the random process than the user is still valid even in the
setting with quantum mechanics.
Another complication that comes with quantum mechanics in the picture is that the
adversary is allowed to hold quantum information (i.e. quantum state ρE instead of
classical random variable E) about X. It has been shown that such adversary is in some
cases stronger than the adversary holding classical information only. This is the reason
why the side information understanding of the weak sources is prevalent in quantum
literature. We will define and discuss weak sources with quantum side information in
Subsection (2.4).
Another topic discussed in this section is the most common approach to tackle with
the problem of weak randomness. Because perfect randomness is expected by most of
the applications, it is natural to attempt to post–process weak randomness into nearly
perfect randomness, which can be subsequently used in algorithms and protocols. This
process is called randomness extraction and it is widely studied for all types of weak
sources.
With respect to this task, we can divide weak sources of randomness into two classes –
extractable sources and non-extractable sources. From extractable sources one can obtain
by a deterministic procedure nearly perfect randomness. Although various examples of
non-trivial extractable sources do exist (see Subsection 2.2.1 or [87, 44] and references
therein), most natural sources, for example defined by the entropy of allowed distributions
(see Subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), are non-extractable. In such cases non-deterministic
randomness extractors (see Subsection 2.3 ) have to be used.
In what follows we will introduce some of the most studied types of weak randomness
sources.
2.2.1 Von Neumann sources
Historically, the first consideration of weak random source is due to von Neumann [92].
The so called von Neumann source produces a string of equally biased independent coin
flips.
Definition 1 (Von Neumann source). The von Neumann source is defined as a sequence
X1, X2, . . . of binary independent random variables with fixed but unknown bias. That
is, ∀i ∈ N,Pr[Xi = 0] = ε and Pr[Xi = 1] = 1− ε, for some (unknown) 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1.
The parallel with our general definition of the weak sources as sets of probability
distributions over the same domain is clear, when we consider n-bit string produced by
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Fig. 2.1. An example of distribution of von Neumann source. This concrete distribution has
ε = 2
5
. The other distributions from the source have different values of ε. However, for each
distribution from a von Neumann source it holds that strings with the equal number of 0’s appear
with the same probability.
a von Neumann source. Such string can be described by a set of joint random variables
Y = X1 . . . Xn, characterized by a parameter ε (see Fig. 2.1).
In his paper, von Neumann designed a deterministic procedure to extract random
bits from any von Neumann source. The procedure takes outputs of neighboring random
variables X2m−1 and X2m and compares them. If they are equal, they are both discarded,
otherwise X2m is added to the output string. Formally, von Neumann extractor Ext is
defined as follows:
Ext(X1, . . . , Xn) = Y1, . . . Yk,
where Yi = X2mi andm1 < m2 < · · · < mk are all indicesm < n such thatX2m−1 6= X2m
(see Fig. 2.2).
The von Neumann extractor has all the expected properties of randomness extractors.
First of all, the output bits are uniformly distributed for any bias ε. This is quite
straightforward to see, because Pr[Xi = 1∧Xi+1 = 0] = ε(1−ε) = Pr[Xi = 0∧Xi+1 = 1].
Secondly, independence of the output bits is implied by the independence of input bits.
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
Input: 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 . . .
Output: 1 discard discard 0 . . .
Y1 Y2
Fig. 2.2. A schematic drawing of von Neumann extractor. Random output bits are generated
from pairs of input bits. Pairs with equal values are discarded, while the second bit of a non-equal
pair is used as the output.
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Fig. 2.3. An example of a distribution of a SV-source with n = 3 and ε = 1
4
. This example
maximizes the probability of outputting a string with odd parity. Note that each string appears
with non-zero probability.
One of the most important drawbacks of this simple procedure is that it discards
non-negligible portion of randomness. The procedure was later improved by Peres [69],
who showed how to efficiently extract the amount of random bits that is close to the
entropy of the source by exploiting the discarded bits.
The von Neumann source is rarely regarded in the literature nowadays. The reason for
this is that the assumption of independence of bits Xi is considered to be very strong and
unrealistic. However the von Neumann source is worth mentioning, because it conveys
one important message: The set of probability distributions in the von Neumann source
is uncountable (ε is a real parameter), yet the source is extractable. This hints on the
fact that in the question of extractability the size of the source is less relevant than it’s
structure and the structure of von Neumann source is too strong in this sense.
2.2.2 Santha-Vazirani sources
More general notion of weak sources randomness are so called Santha-Vazirani sources
(SV-sources) [78].
Definition 2 (Santha-Vazirani source). A Santha–Vazirani source with a parameter
0 ≤ ε ≤ 12 is defined as a sequence of binary random variables X1, X2, . . . , such that
∀i ∈ N,∀x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1},
Pr [Xi = 1|Xi−1 = xi−1 . . . X1 = x1] ∈
〈
1
2
− ε, 1
2
+ ε
〉
.
Note that in this model the bias can change for each bit Xi to some extent, and what
is more, the bias can depend on previously generated bits. Informally, we suppose that
each bit contains some amount of randomness (bounded from below) even conditioned
on the previous ones. Here again, for fixed n and ε, SV-source can be interpreted as a set
of probability distributions over n-bit strings (see Fig. 2.3). However, the restriction on
the allowed distributions is much less stringent comparing to the von Neumann source
due to the allowed correlations between bits. For example, for ε = 12 every probability
distribution over n-bit strings is in the set of allowed distributions S. On the other hand,
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SV-source with ε = 0 contains only a single distribution – the uniform distribution Un.
Another important property that we will use in the Section 5 is that for SV-sources with
ε < 12 every n-bit string appears with non-zero probability.
Because the SV-sources are less restricted than von Neumann sources, they are more
suitable for modeling real world random number generators. The price to pay are several
negative results that have been proven for Santha-Vazirani soures. Santha and Vazirani
[78] themselves have shown that it is impossible to extract even a single unbiased bit
from an SV-source. More precisely, any compression of bits from SV-source with ε, in
a form of a boolean function f : {0, 1}m 7→ {0, 1} cannot produce another, improved
SV source with ε′ < ε. More importantly it has been shown by various authors [55, 29]
that even slightly biased SV-sources, i.e. sources with low ε, are not suitable for many
cryptographic purposes. On the other hand Vazirani and Vazirani [90] have shown how
to simulate a class of bounded error randomized algorithms with a single SV-source.
However, even though the deterministic extraction fails, there is a possibility to post-
process SV-sources with the help of additional randomness. An example of such addi-
tional resource is another independent SV-source. In this setting Vazirani [89] has shown
that for any ε and two independent sources with SV parameter ε there exists an efficient
procedure to extract a single almost perfect bit. More precisely, if X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is
the outcome of the first source and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) is the outcome of the second source,
post-processing function Ext is defined as
Ext(X,Y ) = (X1 · Y1)⊕ (X2 · Y2)⊕ · · · ⊕ (Xn · Yn), (2.1)
where ⊕ denotes sum modulo 2. In other words the function Ext is a scalar product
between the two n-bit strings X and Y . This function is very useful in other randomness
extractor constructions as we will see in the remainder of this section and in the Section
5. Extraction for SV-sources is sometimes called randomness amplification, as it can be
interpreted as transforming two ε SV-sources into another ε′ SV-source with ε′ < ε, at
the rate of 1m (i.e. m bits of the original sources are transformed into a single bit of the
new, improved source). Note that in general compressing more bits will result in a lower
ε′ of the resulting SV-source.
This extraction function for SV-sources nicely demonstrates some important concepts
in the area of randomness extraction. First of all, in order to be able to extract, we need
an additional, independent source of randomness, be it another weak source or a short
random seed. Second, the quality of the output depends on both the length and quality
of the input. We will discuss these concepts in more detail in Subsection 2.3.
2.2.3 Min-entropy sources
Santha-Vazirani sources require that each produced bit contains some amount of ran-
domness even conditioned on the previous ones. In order to generalize this definition
Chor and Goldreich [18] introduced sources, where the randomness is not guaranteed in
every single bit, but instead it is guaranteed in each n-bit block. The randomness in
blocks is guaranteed by it’s min-entropy defined as
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Definition 3 (Min-entropy). A min-entropy H∞(X) of a n-bit random variable X is
defined as:
H∞(X) = min
x∈{0,1}
(− log2(Pr[X = x])) .
Informally min-entropy is minus logarithm of the probability of the most probable
element. The randomness in blocks is therefore guaranteed by the restriction of the most
probable n-bit string appearing as the outcome of the block. The most probable element
of a distribution is of a special interest as it also constitutes the best strategy in trying
to guess the outcome of the variable – simply guessing the most probable element. This
leads us to the following formal definition:
Definition 4 (Block source). A (n, k)-block source is modeled by a sequence of n-bit
random variables X1, X2, . . . , such that
∀i ∈ N,∀x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1}n, H∞(Xi|Xi−1 = xi−1, . . . , X1 = x1) ≥ k.
In order to recover the view of such a randomness source as a set of probability
distributions over the same domain, we simply need to consider finite number of blocks.
It is also easy to see that SV-sources are recovered with n = 1 and ε = 2−H∞(X)− 12 .
In order to show that the block sources are a strict generalization of SV-sources we
must invoke an argument suggesting that there are no deterministic extractors that can
extract even a single bit from the block sources. A deterministic single-bit extractor is
again considered to be a boolean function f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}. We will proceed to show
that for every f , there exists a probability distribution on the inputs with min-entropy
n− 1, such that the output of f is constant.
Consider an arbitrary f and let us split the set of n-bit strings into two subsets
D0 = {x|f(x) = 0} and D1 = {x|f(x) = 1}. Without the loss of generality assume that
|D0| ≥ 2n−1. Now consider a random variable X, such that Pr[X = x] = 1|D0| for x ∈ D0
and Pr[X = x] = 0 otherwise. Random variable X has min-entropy at least n − 1, but
f(X) outputs a constant bit 0. This indicates that deterministic extraction is impossible
even for sources with very high min-entropy. Moreover, this also implies that a block
source cannot be transformed into an SV-source with ε < 12 and therefore min-entropy
block sources are indeed a strict generalization of the Santha-Vazirani sources.
Of course one might want to employ deterministic functions that try to extract from
more than one block of the source. In fact, such strategy doesn’t provide any advantage,
as m blocks can be seen as a single block of a source with block size of mn.
Up to this point we defined randomness sources as infinite streams of bits with differ-
ent requirements on their structure. This view is very useful when considering random
number generators, which supposedly can produce any number of random bits on de-
mand. However in most applications we use only a finite number of random bits. Random
inputs into these applications can be treated as sources of randomness of finite size. This
view suggests yet another generalization of the block sources – sources of randomness
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Fig. 2.4. A possible probability distribution of a (3,2)–source. Notice that this model allows
strings which have zero probability to appear.
of finite output size, where no internal structure, such as guaranteed entropy in every
bit (SV-sources) or every block of certain size (block sources) is assumed. The only
guarantee of randomness is it’s overall min-entropy (see Fig. 2.4).
Definition 5 (Min-entropy source.). An n-bit random variable X, such that
H∞(X) ≥ k
is called an (n, k)-source.
Note that in this view, a min-entropy source is a set of distributions with an upper
bound on the probability of the most probable element imposed by min-entropy. This
is incidentally the probability of success of the best strategy to guess the outcome of
the variable. Such sources were introduced by Zuckerman [93] and nowadays are the
most studied type of weak sources. Also note that randomness extractors for this type
of sources (discussed in Subsection 2.3) can easily be used for block sources as well by
simply applying them block-wise.
Since we will discuss min-entropy sources in this paper as well, we need several more
definitions. For any n-bit random variable X with H∞(X) ≥ k, let us denote it’s min-
entropy loss as c = n− k and it’s min-entropy rate as kn . The last important definition
is that of the flat sources.
Definition 6 (Flat source). Let S ⊂ {0, 1}n. A random n-bit variable X is flat on S,
if for all x ∈ S,
Pr[X = x] =
1
|S| .
By extension, for all y /∈ S, Pr[X = y] = 0. If |S| ≥ 2k, it is a (n, k)- flat source.
In other words, the flat sources with min-entropy k are distributed according to a
probability distribution that is uniform on sufficiently large subset of possible outcomes
(see Fig. 2.5). More importantly, any source with min-entropy k is a convex combination
of flat sources with min-entropy k and it can be shown that in many applications the flat
sources manifest the worst case behavior. That is why the analysis is often carried out
on the flat sources only.
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Fig. 2.5. A possible distribution of a flat source with n = 3 and k = 2.
2.3 Randomness extractors
As mentioned previously, it is a very common scenario to post-process weak randomness,
with the use of randomness extractors. These algorithms produce nearly perfect random-
ness, which can later be used in other applications. The aim of randomness extraction
from (n, k)-sources is to turn a bit string distributed according to arbitrary probability
distribution with min-entropy at least k into a possibly shorter bit string that is close to
being perfectly random. Concept of closeness can be summed by the following definition.
Definition 7 (ε-closeness). Random variables X and Y over the same domain D are
ε-close, if:
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
x∈D
|Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]| ≤ ε
The usefulness of this definition perhaps becomes more evident when we point out
that ∆(X,Y ) can be equivalently defined as |pX(A)−pY (A)| ≤ ε for every event A ⊆ D,
therefore variables X and Y are almost indistinguishable.
It can be shown that the min-entropy of a variable X gives the upper bound on the
number of extractable almost uniformly distributed bits [80]. In other words, if k bits can
be extracted from a random variable X, then X has min-entropy at least k. Informally
we say that a (n, k)-distributed variable X contains k bits of randomness. It is for this
reason that min-entropy sources have become the most widely considered model of weak
randomness in the literature.
2.3.1 Seeded extractors
As we mentioned earlier, deterministic extraction is impossible for min-entropy sources.
Nevertheless, as we have learned in the case of SV-sources, extraction might be possible
with additional resources. The most widely studied constructions are seeded extractors,
in which the extra resource is an additional short, uniformly distributed random string,
called the seed.
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Definition 8 (Seeded extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s 7→ {0, 1}m is a
seeded (k, ε)-extractor if for every (n, k)-distributed random variable X,
∆(Ext(X,Us), Um) ≤ ε.
Sometimes a stronger definition of extractor is needed and the output is required to
be random even to an entity that has seen the value of the seed. This can be formally
written as
Definition 9 (Strong extractor.). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s 7→ {0, 1}m is a
strong seeded (k, ε)-extractor if for every (n, k)-distributed random variable X,
∆(Us ◦ Ext(X,Us), Us ◦ Um) ≤ ε,
where ◦ is concatenation and two copies of Us denote the same random variable.
Strong extractors can be seen as a set of deterministic extractors {Ext(·, s)|s ∈ {0, 1}}
with a following property: For any given (n, k)-source X most of the extractors in the
set constitute a good extractor for X. This property will be used in Subsection 5.3 as a
basic building block for a randomness amplification protocol.
There are several parameters against which the quality of the extractor can be eval-
uated. First of all we want the seed s to be as small as possible, because, as we have
argued, (nearly) perfect randomness is a scarce resource. Second of all, we want the
extractor to successfully extract randomness even from sources with low min-entropy k.
In fact, it is easier to extract randomness from sources with higher min-entropy and the
required min-entropy often depends on the length of the source n. This requirement
becomes more clear when one realizes that the overall quality of the source is more ac-
curately expressed by the min-entropy rate kn then the total min-entropy k. Intuitively
it should be clear that a (100, 2)-source is much worse than a (3, 2) source.
Naturally, we want m > s to actually gain some randomness, ideally we want to
achieve the maximum possible size of the output m = s + k. We also require the
statistical distance ε of the output from an uniform random variable Um to be as small
as possible, typically ε is a function of all n, k and s. Last but not the least, we want
the extractor to be efficient and efficiently constructible, meaning that given parameters
n and k the function Ext must be constructible in polynomial time in both of these
parameters and it’s evaluation should also be possible in time polynomial in both n and
k.
The optimal parameters of extractors obtained by probabilistic methods [73] are seed
length of s = log n+O(1), output length of m = k+s−O(1) and such optimal extractor
is able to extract from a source with any min-entropy k, regardless of it’s length n. Note
however, that this extractor is non-explicit, and therefore not efficiently constructible.
Even though the construction of an optimal extractor is not known, there are known
extractor constructions that obtain optimal values for any pair of these three parameters.
The best recent constructions according to the output length and the seed length are
introduced in [52, 41].
As an example of a min-entropy extractor we will introduce a construction based on
universal hashing [17].
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Definition 10 (Universal hashing). A set H of hash functions H : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}`
is a universal family of hash functions if for any w1 6= w2 ∈ {0, 1}n, and for any
x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}`,
Pr[h(w1) = x1 ∧ h(w2) = x2] = 2−2`,
where the probability is taken over uniform choice of hash function h ∈ H.
There are known construction for such families of hash functions of size 22n for every
` < n. Let us parametrize such set as H = {hs|s ∈ {0, 1}2n}.
Definition 11 (Universal hashing extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2n 7→
{0, 1}m defined as
Ext : (x, s) = s ◦ hs(x)
is a (m− s+ 2 log(1/ε), ε) extractor for every ε.
This extractor was first introduced in [84] and it has optimal output length and can
extract from sources with any k – as long as m = k+s−2 log(1/ε)−O(1), the output is at
most ε far from uniform distribution. For more details and history of seeded extraction
consult any of the excellent surveys of this topic [67, 80] and references therein.
2.3.2 Extraction from several independent sources
The disadvantage of the seeded extraction is that it requires uniformly distributed seed,
which, as we argued before, is difficult to obtain. This fact leads to another direction in
designing randomness extractors, which is to consider extracting randomness from several
independent min-entropy sources. We will define such extractor for two independent
sources, while generalization to several sources is straightforward.
Definition 12 (Two source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}` is a
(kX , kY , ε)-extractor if for every two independent (n, kX) source X and (n, kY ) source Y
‖Ext(X,Y )− U`‖1 ≤ ε.
A pair of sources was already considered by Chor and Goldreich [18]. Multi-source
extractors were subsequently studied by many other authors [27, 28, 74] and the best
recent constructions can be found in [6].
One longstanding problem of multi-source extractors is to find explicit constructions
for the sources with low min-entropy rate. Probability argument suggests that the lower
bound on extractable min-entropy is in the order O(log2(n)), where n is the length of
the input strings. Nevertheless, explicit constructions existed only for sources with min-
entropy rate greater than n2 . Only recently Bourgain [12] has broken the
n
2 barrier and
shown how to construct extractors for sources with min-entropy below n2 .
In order to show an example of a two source extractor, let us first revisit the scalar
product function. It turns out scalar product is essential in building two source extractors.
In this context it is sometimes also called the Hadamard extractor, and is often used as
a primitive to extract a single bit.
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Definition 13 (Hadamard extractor). A function Had : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}
defined as
Had(x, y) =
(
n∑
i=1
xi · yi
)
mod 2,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) is a (kX , kY , 2
n−kX−kY −1
2 ) extractor.
In order to show how to expand Hadamard extractor in order to extract more than
a single bit, we present a construction introduced by Dodis et. al. [27].
Definition 14 (DEOR extractor). For all n > 0 there exists a set of n × n matrices
{A1, . . . , An} over GF (2) such that for any non-empty set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, AS =
∑
i∈S Ai
has full rank. Let n ≥ m > 0. A Function ExtD : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}m defined as
ExtD(x, y) = Had(A1x, y), Had(A2x, y), . . . ,Had(Amx, y)
is a (kX , kY , 2
n+m−kX−kY −1
2 ) extractor. Here GF (2) is a field of addition and multiplica-
tion modulo 2.
We have shown in [10] that Hadamard extractor can be improved, especially for
sources with high min-entropy. We focused on one of the weaknesses of the Hadamard
extractor – if one of the randomness sources, say X, happens to be uniform, the extractor
fails to produce unbiased bit. In our paper we proposed a function which produces bits
with constantly better bias for (n, k)-sources with k < n−1. What is more, the distance ε
of the produced bit from a uniform bit approaches 0 as k approaches n. Our construction
is presented in the next definition.
Definition 15 (BPP extractor). A function Had⊕ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1} defined
as
H⊕(x, y) =
(
x1 + y1 +
n∑
i=2
xi · yi
)
mod 2,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) is a (kX , kY , 2
n−kX−kY −3
2 ) extractor.
Our extractor therefore obtains
√
2 times smaller bias than the Hadamard extractor.
Moreover, contrary to the Hadamard extractor, the bias of the proposed extractor is 0
if at least one of the input sources is uniform. Another interesting property is that our
construction can beat the n2 bound in some cases.
Our extractor can be plugged into the DEOR (see Def. 14) construction, in which
case we obtain a (kX , kY ,
√
3
2 2
n+m−kX−kY −1
2 ) extractor, which is slightly better than the
original construction. Surprisingly, this advantage in the extraction without the strong-
ness property is not retained in the strong extraction scenario. In fact, our extractor is√
3
2 worse than the extractor based on the Hadamard construction.
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2.4 Weak sources with quantum side information
So far, we have considered only classical weak sources, i.e. sources described by classical
random variables with unknown probability distribution or, equivalently, classical ran-
dom variables with adversaries holding some classical information about their outcome.
In quantum information, however, this is not the most general model of weak randomness
sources – a potential adversary might obtain side information about the source in form
of quantum states.
In order to formalize this approach we need to introduce some new notation.
Definition 16 (cq-state). Let Z be a classical random variable and {ρz}z∈Z a set of
density matrices. Then we denote the cq-state:
ZρZ =
∑
z∈Z
Pr[Z = z]|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρz.
Supposing the adversary holds the quantum part of a cq-state and the device produ-
cing randomness holds the classical part, the weak source is obtained by measuring the
classical part of the state in the computational basis – quantum mechanics guarantees
that the measurement outcomes will be distributed according to the distribution pZ of the
random variable Z. Moreover according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics, this randomness is objective, therefore weak randomness is modeled in the
spirit of our second definition – the adversary obtains information about the source via a
side channel: in this case, for each outcome z the adversary obtains a state ρz. Generally
the adversary holds a mixed state ρZ =
∑
z∈Z Pr[Z = z]ρz and tries to infer as much
information as possible about the corresponding classical outcome.
In order to clearly formulate the capabilities of the adversary, the following scenario
is typically considered. The adversary obtains the outcome z of the random variable Z
and stores quantum information about it in a quantum memory, by applying a quantum
operation Uz to it, resulting in a state ρz. If all the states in {ρz}z∈Z are distinguishable,
the adversary can obtain all the outcomes with probability 1, simply by using the distin-
guishing measurement. Therefore there remains a question how to bound the adversary’s
knowledge in a meaningful way.
There are two ways to do this, both inspired by the classical min-entropy sources.
First of all, the dimension of states ρz can be restricted. In such scenario, the adversary
is given the outcome of the variable, but is allowed to store only b qubits about it. If one
allows the adversary only classical memory, min-entropy sources are recovered – storage
of b classical bits about a source that is uniformly distributed ensures that it’s resulting
min-entropy conditioned on the adversary’s memory is at least n− b.
Recall that min-entropy of a classical source can also be interpreted as the upper
bound on the probability of correct guess of it’s outcome. In the same spirit we can
restrict the amount of information the reduced state ρZ contains about the random
variable Z. Formally, we will restrict adversary’s probability to guess the outcome of Z
correctly by restricting it’s guessing entropy given ρZ . As adversary’s strategy consists
of measuring ρZ , we need to optimize over all possible POVMs.
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Definition 17 (Guessing entropy). Let XρX be an arbitrary cq-state. The guessing
entropy of X given ρX is
Hg(X ← ρX) = − log max
M
Ex←X [Tr(Mxρx)],
where the maximum is taken over all |X | outcome POVMs M = {Mx|x ∈ X}.
Perhaps, more intuitive form is
Hg(X ← ρX) = − log max
M
Pr[M(ρX) = X],
where M(ρX) is a random variable we obtain by measuring the state ρX by a POVM M .
An alternative concept, often used in literature is called conditional min-entropy [76],
but it has been shown that the two definitions are equivalent [48].
The definition of the weak source is now straightforward. A source X is a (n, k)-source
against quantum memory ρX , if Hg(X ← ρX) ≥ k.
Randomness extraction is studied for both sources with bounded storage (see i.e.
[47, 26] and the references therein) and sources with guaranteed guessing entropy [25].
One of the most prominent results is that quantum side information can in some cases
offer a significant advantage to the adversary in extraction scenario, when compared to
it’s classical counterpart. This was proven by Gavinsky et. al. [37] who constructed a
strong randomness extractor which is secure against classical adversaries, but fails to pro-
duce almost perfect randomness against adversaries holding quantum information. More
precisely, their construction outputs almost perfectly random bits against an adversary
with o(
√
n) bits of storage, while it fails against an adversary with O(log(n)) quantum
bits used for storage.
On the positive side, some of the existing extractors for classical weak sources have
been proven to be secure against both types of quantum side information, among them the
construction based on universal hashing [86] (see Def. 11). The recently best construction
against adversaries with bounded storage can be found in [26] and against guessing
entropy adversaries in [25].
Extraction without the access to uniform seed is even more complicated in case of
sources with quantum side information. We will consider the case of extraction with two
weak sources, which can easily be generalized to multiple source extractors.
In this scenario we assume that there are two non-communicating adversaries, one
for each weak source. After the sources produce their outcomes, the two adversaries
meet and try to guess the outcome of the extractor. In order to see that this level
of abstraction is necessary, assume only a single adversary. In the side information
formalism introduced earlier, he first receives the outcomes x and y of random variables X
and Y representing the weak sources, and tries to save some restricted information about
them in a quantum memory. Because he can see both random inputs of the extractor,
he can simply calculate it’s outcome Ext(x, y) and store it. The outcome Ext(x, y)
by definition contains almost no information about the individual inputs, thus fulfilling
the restricted information requirements. In other words in this model the outputs of
variables X and Y are easily made correlated via adversary’s memory that is why we
need to assume two non-communicating adversaries.
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To add more complexity to the problem, we can allow the adversaries’ memories
to be entangled. This leads to several different models: bounded memory adversaries
with/without entanglement and guessing entropy adversaries with/without entangle-
ment. Kasher and Kempe [45] studied the DEOR construction introduced in the previ-
ous section (see Def. 14) in various settings of this type and were able to obtain positive
results for both entangled and non-entangled bounded memory adversaries and non-
entangled guessing entropy adversaries. The remaining scenario with entangled guessing
entropy adversaries proved to be too strong and the DEOR construction does not pro-
vide any security in this case. Moreover, it is not clear if such strong constructions of
extractors are even possible.
This concludes the short introduction into the wide field of weak randomness and we
are ready to present the main topic of this paper.
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3 Bell inequalities and randomness
In this section we will explain in detail what Bell type inequalities are and how their
violation guarantees that the outcomes of certain measurements are fundamentally unde-
termined. This fact is exploited in the construction of randomness generation protocols.
3.1 The local set and determinism
The simplest scenario of a Bell type non-locality test consists of two spatially separated
observers, Alice and Bob, who measure a bipartite system produced by a common source.
Both Alice and Bob can choose one of several possible measurement settings. After the
measurement both of them record the outcome. Let us label Alice’s choice of measure-
ment setting x ∈ X = {1, . . . ,MA} and Bob’s choice y ∈ Y = {1, . . . ,MB} and their
outcomes a ∈ A = {1, . . .mA} and b ∈ B = {1, . . . ,mB} (see Fig. 3.1). If this procedure
is repeated many times, Alice and Bob can communicate their measurement settings and
outcomes to each other and estimate probabilities pAB|XY (ab|xy) = Pr[AB = ab|XY =
xy], where X,Y are the random variables governing the inputs and A,B the random
variables governing the outputs of the boxes. We say the outcomes are correlated, if for
some x, y, a, b
pAB|XY (ab|xy) 6= pA|X(a|x)pB|Y (b|y). (3.1)
Existence of correlations isn’t anything surprising. In fact correlations are very natu-
ral and can be classically explained by some common cause of the observed statistics.
Formally, one can model the cause of these correlations by a set of random variables Λ,
which have causal influence on both measurement outcomes, but are inaccessible to the
observers. In a local hidden variable model, taking into account all the possible causes
Alice Bob
x
a
y
b
Fig. 3.1. Two party Bell type experiment. Alice’s measurement setting is x and Bob’s y. Their
respective outcomes are a and b. The black barrier represents their inability to communicate,
e.g. by separating the experiments by a space-time interval.
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Λ, outcomes of the experiments are fully independent, i.e., for all a, b, x, y, λ
pAB|XY Λ(ab|xy, λ) = pA|XΛ(a|x, λ)pB|Y Λ(b|y, λ). (3.2)
This in fact represents an explanation of the correlations according to which Alice’s
outcome depends only on her local measurement setting x and some common cause
for the correlations λ and not on distant Bob’s measurement setting and outcome, and
analogously Bob’s outcome doesn’t depend on anything that Alice does. This is in fact
a crucial assumption required by the theory of relativity, which forbids non-local causal
influence for spatially separated entities. To complete the picture we must take into
account the probability distribution of Λ – pΛ. This gives rise to a local hidden variable
condition:
pAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∫
Λ
dλpΛ(λ)pA|X(a|x, λ)pB|Y (b|y, λ). (3.3)
This characterization contains an implicit assumption – the measurement settings x and
y can be chosen independently of λ. Formally,
pΛ|XY (λ|x, y) = pΛ(λ). (3.4)
Notice that so far we haven’t assumed anything about the determinism of measure-
ments in the local model, as condition (3.3) states only that the outcomes are probabilis-
tically determined. In deterministic local hidden variables model, which is a special case
of the above, each outcome is uniquely determined by λ and the corresponding input x,
i.e. for each outcome a, input x and hidden cause λ, pA|XΛ(a|x, λ) is equal to either 1
or 0, and similarly for b, y and λ.
In fact, local hidden variables are fully equivalent to deterministic local hidden vari-
ables, as first proven by Fine [34]. The reason why both definitions are equivalent stems
from the fact that all randomness present in the probability functions pA|XΛ(a|x, λ) and
pB|Y Λ(b|y, λ), can always be incorporated into the shared random variable. To show this,
let us introduce two continuous variables µA, µB ∈ [0, 1] and introduce a new common
variable Λ′ = (Λ, µA, µB). Let
pA|XΛ′(a|x, λ′) =
{
1 if F (a− 1|x, λ) ≤ µA < F (a|x, λ)
0 otherwise,
(3.5)
where F (a|x, λ) = ∑a′≤a pA|XΛ(a′|x, λ), be new deterministic function governing out-
comes of Alice and define analogous function for Bob. If we choose both µA and µB with
uniform distribution, we will recover the prediction of the general model.
So far, we have shown that observed correlations that admit decomposition as in Eq.
(3.3) can be explained by a fully deterministic model – outcomes of the measurement are
completely predetermined by the measurement settings and some hidden variables.
In the next subsection we will show how to certify that there is no local hidden
variable model for the observed correlations, as in the case for certain measurements of
quantum systems.
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3.2 Bell inequalities
In the previous subsection we have shown the equivalence between deterministic and
general local hidden variable models that can both explain correlations observed. This
result has in fact one more corollary – we need to consider only finite number of hidden
variables. Indeed, in a deterministic model each variable in Λ specifies an outcome for
one concrete input. The general model is a probabilistic mixture of these assignments
from outputs to inputs. Since the total number of inputs and outputs is finite, so is
the total number of different assignments and thus there is a finite number of hidden
variables.
More formally, we can equivalently write down the model in (3.3) as follows: Let us
define the values of hidden variables Λ as λ = (a1, . . . , aMA , b1, . . . , bMB ). For each value
of λ we can construct the corresponding deterministic input to output assignment dλ as:
dλ(ab|xy) =
{
1 if a = ax and b = by
0 otherwise.
(3.6)
There are mMAa m
MB
b possible values of λ and thus m
MA
a m
MB
b deterministic measurement
outcome assignments. Observed probability pAB|XY (ab|xy) can be explained by local
hidden variables, if it can be written as a convex combination of such deterministic local
points:
pAB|XY (xy|ab) =
∑
λ
pΛ(λ)d
λ(ab|xy), (3.7)
where pΛ(λ) ≥ 0,
∑
λ pΛ(λ) = 1, i.e. pΛ is the probability distribution of the deterministic
points dλ.
The set of possible hidden variable models is a convex hull of a finite number of
deterministic points dλ, and therefore in terms of geometry it is a polytope. Any linear
inequality defining a half-space in which the whole local polytope L resides can be used
as a witness that a distribution violating this inequality is non-local. Inequalities of this
type are called Bell inequalities. To identify the optimal set of Bell inequalities, it suffices
to recall basic results in the theory of polytopes – a polytope can be represented not only
by all it’s vertices, as in Eq. (3.7), but equivalently it can be represented by a finite
number of half-spaces – the facets of the polytope. Each such facet can be expressed by
a linear inequality of the form
∑
a,b,x,y cabxypAB|XY (ab|xy) ≤ Sl, where cabxy are some
linear coefficients defining the Bell inequality and Sl is the maximum value attainable by
local probabilities
P =
{
pAB|XY (ab|xy)|a ∈ A, b ∈ B, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y
}
, (3.8)
belonging to the local polytope L. Such set of probabilities P is also called behavior.
Hence an observed behavior P lies in the local polytope L, if and only if:
∑
a,b,x,y
cabxypAB|XY (ab|xy) ≤ Sil ∀i ∈ I, (3.9)
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where I is a finite index set of linear inequalities corresponding to the facets of the local
polytope. Conversely, if behavior P is non-local, it necessarily violates at least one of
these Bell inequalities. Note that some facets are trivial and correspond to positivity
conditions (pAB|XY (ab|xy) ≥ 0). These are obviously never violated by any physical
behavior. All other facets are violated by some non-local behaviours, some of them even
by quantum behaviours as we will show next. It is important to note that although there
exist algorithms for obtaining all the polytope facets, given it’s vertices, they become
extremely time-consuming as the number of inputs, outputs or parties grow. This is the
reason why the study of Bell inequalities is a fruitful research area up to these days.
As an example we introduce here one of the most studied Bell inequalities. Consider
the simplest scenario where both Alice and Bob choose one of two measurements x, y ∈
{0, 1} = B and obtain one of two measurement outcomes, which we label a, b ∈ {−1, 1} =
A. In this case the local polytope L has been fully characterized [34]. The only non-
trivial facet inequality is the CHSH inequality introduced in [20]. Let 〈axby〉 =
∑
ab ab ·
pAB|XY (ab|xy) be an expectation value of the product ab after measuring x and y. The
CHSH inequality then reads:
ICHSH = 〈a0b0〉+ 〈a0b1〉+ 〈a1b0〉 − 〈a1b1〉 ≤ 2. (3.10)
Let us now analyze classical strategies. In order to maximize the CHSH expression
ICHSH , we simultaneously want to achieve the highest possible value for 〈a0b0〉, 〈a0b1〉
and 〈a1b0〉 and the lowest possible value of 〈a1b1〉. It is easy to see that with deterministic
assignments, we can achieve the best value for three out of the four expressions. As
an example consider a strategy such that for any question both Alice and Bob answer
1. Then pAB|XY (11|00) = pAB|XY (11|10) = pAB|XY (11|01) = 1 which maximizes the
first three expectation values, but also requires pAB|XY (11|11) = 1. As argued before,
all the other local strategies can be seen as convex combinations of such deterministic
assignments and therefore the inequality holds.
Quantum strategy that violates this Bell inequality involves measuring the state
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) . (3.11)
The corresponding measurements can be expressed by the following observables. Alice’s
observables are
A0 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
and A1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (3.12)
while Bob’s observables are
B0 =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and B1 =
1√
2
(
1 −1
−1 −1
)
. (3.13)
By the laws of quantum mechanics we have
〈axby〉 = 〈Ψ+|Ax ⊗By|Ψ+〉. (3.14)
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A B C
x y z
a b c
a⊕ b⊕ c = x ∧ y ∧ z
xyz ∈ {000, 001, 010, 100}
Fig. 3.2. A GHZ test scenario. Three non-communicating boxes A,B,C each take a single bit
input and each produce a single bit output. The test is successful if the condition a ⊕ b ⊕ c =
x ∧ y ∧ z holds. The best classical strategy achieves 75% success probability, the best quantum
strategy achieves success probability 1 and produces two random bits – random variables A and B
describing the outcomes of boxes A and B are fully random and independent. Random variable
C is correlated with A and B via the inputs.
After doing the calculations we can see that
〈a0b0〉 = 〈a0b1〉 = 〈a1b0〉 = −〈a1b1〉 = 1√
2
, (3.15)
yielding the value of the term
ICHSH = 2
√
2, (3.16)
which is certainly larger than 2.
Another well known Bell inequality we will extensively use in this paper is called GHZ
inequality [38]. We will introduce it in an alternative formalism used to describe quan-
tum non-locality inspired by game theory. This formalism is very useful and every Bell
inequality can be expressed as a game, including the CHSH game introduced previously
as we will see in Subsection 4.2.
The GHZ inequality requires three non-communicating parties and it can be defined
in terms of a three party game (see Fig. 3.2). Each of the three non-communicating boxes
receives a single input bit and produces a single output bit. Let us denote the input bits
of the respective boxes by x, y and z and the corresponding output bits by a, b and c.
For the valid input combinations holds that x ∧ y ∧ z = 1, i.e. we consider only inputs
xyz ∈ {111, 100, 010, 001} simultaneously passed to all boxes. The value v of the GHZ
term is a function of the 4 conditional probabilities pABC|XY Z and the joint probability
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distribution pXY Z of the inputs:
v =
∑
a⊕b⊕c=1
pABC|XY Z(abc|111)pXY Z(111)+
+
∑
a⊕b⊕c=0
pABC|XY Z(abc|100)pXY Z(100)+
+
∑
a⊕b⊕c=0
pABC|XY Z(abc|010)pXY Z(010)+
+
∑
a⊕b⊕c=0
pABC|XY Z(abc|001)pXY Z(001). (3.17)
In particular, for the uniform input distribution we set pXY Z(111) = pXY Z(100) =
pXY Z(010) = pXY Z(001) =
1
4 and denote the GHZ term by vu.
Assuming the uniform distribution on all four inputs, the maximal value of vu achiev-
able by classical device [38] is 34 (thus the GHZ inequality reads vu ≤ 34 ) and there exists
a classical device that can make any 3 conditional probabilities simultaneously equal to
1. In the quantum world we can achieve vu = 1 and satisfy perfectly all 4 conditional
probabilities using the tripartite GHZ state 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉) and measuring σX (σY )
when receiving 0 (1) on input.
The beautiful property of the GHZ inequality is that the violation v gives us directly
the probability that the device passes a test
a⊕ b⊕ c = x ∧ y ∧ z. (3.18)
The probability of failing this test reads 1− v. This property will be extensively used in
construction of device independent randomness amplification protocols of Section 5.
The discussions about quantum non-locality have been part of quantum theory from
the beginning and many have considered it controversial [31]. However, quantum viola-
tions of Bell inequalities have now been convincingly verified in many experiments (see
for example [3]).
Now we are finally ready to formulate the main message of this Section – violation
of a Bell inequality guarantees at least some amount of randomness in outcomes of the
experiments. This fact can be intuitively understood by the following argumentation:
Local model (3.3) is equivalent to a deterministic model, where to each setting x, y
and hidden variable λ the outcomes a and b are deterministically assigned. However,
such model is excluded by the violation of a Bell inequality. The observed correlations
thus cannot be explained by deterministic assignments and therefore the measurement
outcomes are fundamentally undetermined.
This intuition certainly requires more clarification. In fact just as every local ex-
planation is equivalent to a deterministic local explanation, it can be shown that every
non-local behavior can be explained by a model that deterministically assigns outputs a
and b depending on both measurement settings x and y. However every such explana-
tion is necessarily signaling – if such explanation were true, Alice would be able to infer
some information about the outcome of Bob’s spatially separated measurement setting
y only by looking at her outcome a and input x. Such interaction could be exploited
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to send signals faster than the speed of light, which is deemed impossible by the theory
of relativity, leaving us with the original explanation – outcomes of the measurements
are fundamentally undetermined. What is more, this type of randomness can be cer-
tified – any observed correlations violating some Bell inequality guarantee presence of
randomness.
It is important to stress that to certify the randomness of outcomes we didn’t have
to assume anything about the inner working procedures of the measurement devices or
the source of measured particles – violation of a Bell inequality itself is sufficient. This is
especially interesting for cryptography, in which it allows for reduction of the assumptions
regarding the security. Quantum protocols which do not require the specification of the
devices are called Device Independent (DI). A variety of protocols with this property
have been devised ranging from self testing [54] to quantum key distribution [32] and
random number generation, which is the main focus of this paper. For more thorough
introduction to Bell inequalities and device independent outlook on quantum physics see
excellent surveys [16, 79].
3.3 The set of quantum behaviors and the no-signaling set
In this subsection we will define the set of behaviors achievable by generalized mea-
surement of a bipartite quantum state, which then can be easily generalized to more
parties. Let us define a bipartite quantum behavior as a vector of probability distribu-
tions pAB|XY (ab|xy), which can be obtained by a measurement of a bipartite quantum
system:
pAB|XY (ab|xy) = Tr(ρMxa ⊗Myb ), (3.19)
where ρ ∈ HA⊗HB is a bipartite quantum state of arbitrary dimension, and Mxa and Myb
are elements of Alice’s POVM Mx = {Mxa |a ∈ A} and Bob’s POVM My = {Myb |b ∈ B}
respectively.
It is interesting to study the set Q of quantum behaviours in the context of Bell
inequalities. For example it is very interesting to ask what is the maximal violation of
Bell inequalities with quantum resources. In fact, the state and measurements presented
in the previous subsection achieves the maximum violation of the CHSH inequality as
shown in [88]. Generally, unlike the set of local correlations L, the set of quantum
behaviors Q is not a polytope and is quite difficult to characterize. In a seminal pa-
per of Navascue´s et. al [64] the authors introduced an infinite hierarchy of semi-definite
conditions Ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , which are necessarily satisfied by all probabilities of the
form (3.19). The number of conditions rises with the index i, however the higher in
the hierarchy the conditions are, the more precise is the characterization of the set
pAB|XY (ab|xy) = Tr(ρMxa ⊗Myb ). This formulation allows solving optimization prob-
lems over the set of quantum behaviors to arbitrary precision using the technique called
semi-definite programming.
The last set of correlations that is often studied in the literature is the set of no-
signaling probability distributions denoted NS. The no-signaling set of distributions re-
quires only that p(ab|xy) are proper probability distributions, i.e. ∀a, b, x, y : pAB|XY (ab|
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Fig. 3.3. A two-dimensional cut of the no-signaling polytope, where L is the local polytope, Q
is the set of quantum behaviors and NS is the non-signaling polytope. The values for two Bell-
type expressions are plotted in the figure, ICHSH is the value of the CHSH expression 3.10 and
ICHSH∗ is it’s symmetric version with labels 0 and 1 interchanged. Notice that a no-signaling
distribution can achieve the CHSH value of 4, which is it’s algebraic maximum.
xy) ≥ 0, ∀x, y : ∑a,b pAB|XY (ab|xy) = 1, and the no-signaling condition:
∀a, x, y, y′
MB∑
b=1
pAB|XY (ab|xy) =
MB∑
b=1
pAB|XY (ab|xy′)
∀b, x, x′, y
MA∑
a=1
pAB|XY (ab|xy) =
MA∑
a=1
pAB|XY (ab|x′y). (3.20)
This condition expresses the inability to utilize these correlations to send signals. The
set of all no-signaling distributions is again a polytope, and a strict hierarchy can be
shown (see Fig. 3.3):
L ⊂ Q ⊂ NS. (3.21)
The advantages of considering the no-signaling set are twofold. First of all, because
of the fact that the set forms a polytope it might make the analysis easier. Moreover,
for certain impossibility theorems for quantum set, it is sufficient to prove the theorems
for a larger set – the no-signaling set. The second advantage is that theorems proven
for no-signaling set will hold even against possible post-quantum theories, which might
allow stronger than quantum correlations. This is especially interesting in the field of
cryptography, where it is desirable to construct cryptosystems secure also in the presence
of possible future theories.
628 Device independent random number generation
4 Randomness expansion
In this section we will discuss protocols for generating random numbers in a device inde-
pendent way. The crucial requirement for the randomness expansion protocols to work
properly is the existence of a short random seed. Part of this seed is used to randomly
choose settings in a Bell experiment and after verification that obtained outcomes violate
a Bell inequality. If the violation is detected we know that the outcomes of the experi-
ment contain some amount of entropy which we need to estimate. Then the rest of the
preexisting randomness is used for classical post-processing of the outcomes via seeded
randomness extractors. The result is a random string, which is longer than the initial
seed, hence the name – randomness expansion.
4.1 Quadratic expansion
These protocols were first suggested by Colbeck [21], but we use the protocol of Piro-
nio et. al. [70] for introduction. The protocol is based on a CHSH experiment. Intuitively,
the greater the violation ICHSH of the CHSH inequality (3.10) is, the more randomness
has been produced in the outcomes of the experiment. Although this intuition is not
entirely correct as later shown in [2], where the maximum production of randomness has
been achieved by a non-maximal CHSH violation.
At first suppose the black-boxes performing the CHSH test were the same in each
of n rounds of the protocol (a round is a single instance of the CHSH experiment) and
for simplicity assume, a Bell violation ICHSH of the underlying measurement process is
given. Let A and B be the random variables describing the outputs of a single run of the
experiment. Measure used to quantify the amount of randomness present in A and B is
the min-entropy H∞(AB|xy) = − log2 maxab p(ab|xy), conditioned on the inputs x and
y. Recall that the amount of nearly perfectly random bits obtainable from a partially
random source is roughly equal to it’s min-entropy (see Def. 3). The aim is therefore to
obtain a lower bound f(ICHSH) on min-entropy, if the process achieves violation ICHSH
of the CHSH inequality:
∀x, y H∞(AB|xy) ≥ f(ICHSH). (4.1)
Having such lower bound for a single run, the min-entropy of all the outputs is at least
nf(ICHSH) and a randomness extractor can be used to transform this randomness into
O(nf(ICHSH)) bits that are close to being uniformly distributed and uncorrelated to
any information the adversary may hold.
In the following we will show how to obtain the lower bound f(ICHSH). Let us label
p∗(ab|xy) the maximum value of p(ab|xy), where x, y are given and the maximum is taken
over all possible values of a and b and all possible quantum probability distributions that
achieve CHSH violation of value ICHSH . Such maximization problem can be written in
a form
p∗(ab|xy) = max p(ab|xy) (4.2)
subject to 〈a0b0〉+ 〈a0b1〉+ 〈a1b0〉 − 〈a1b1〉 = ICHSH (4.3)
p(ab|xy) = Tr(ρMxa ⊗Myb ). (4.4)
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Recall that Eq. (4.3) is a linear constraint and can be written as a linear combination of
probabilities of the form
∑
cabxyp(ab|xy) = ICHSH , where cabxy are constants. The only
remaining complication is to show that it is possible to express Eq. (4.4) in a more useful
way. This can be done by the techniques of Navascues et. al. [64] introduced in previous
section. We can characterize the approximation of the quantum set by semi-definite
conditions Ci. By doing so, we can obtain relaxations of the original problem Ri in the
form of semi-definite programs (SDP). Moreover, the higher in the hierarchy Ci is, the
more precise upper bound on p∗(ab|xy) we can obtain, which in turn gives us better lower
bounds on the min-entropy H∞(AB|xy). Expressing optimization problems in forms of
SDP guarantees that we can find the global maximum with arbitrary precision. In
order to obtain a lower bound that does not depend on the inputs, we need to calculate
the maximum for all combinations of inputs x and y. The authors of [70] used these
techniques to derive the following lower bound:
∀x, y H∞(AB|xy) ≥ f(ICHSH) = 1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− I
2
CHSH
4
)
. (4.5)
The scenario given above is however only an idealization for the case of known CHSH
violation ICHSH . In a real world protocol, to obtain the CHSH violation we would need
infinite number of rounds, and moreover, the measurements and the measured state in
round i can in principle depend on the data from previous rounds. This needs to be dealt
with using a statistical approach which takes into account such memory effects. What
we do is that we repeat the test n times and estimate the observed violation IobsCHSH . It
is given by
IobsCHSH = [a0b0] + [a0b1] + [a1b0]− [a1b1], (4.6)
where [axby] =
∑
ab ab
N(ab|xy)
np(xy) and N(ab|xy) is the number of times outcomes a and
b have been observed after measuring x and y and p(xy) is the probability of a pair
x, y appearing as an input. However, in finite number of rounds such violation can be
obtained with a positive probability even with a fully deterministic strategy. Authors of
[70] were able to upper bound, by δ, the probability that the value of IobsCHSH deviates
from the real value of Bell violation ICHSH by more than ε:
δ = exp
(
− nε
2
2(1/q + Iq)2
)
, (4.7)
where Iq is the maximum obtainable quantum violation of a Bell inequality and q =
maxxy p(xy) is the probability of the most probable measurement setting. Combining all
the previous results, the min-entropy of the produced string R = (a1, b1; a2, b2; . . . ; an, bn)
given all the inputs D = (x1, y1;x2, y2; . . . ;xn, yn) can be bounded from below by
H∞(R|D) ≥ nf(IobsCHSH − ε), (4.8)
with probability more than 1 − δ. What is more, the proof holds even for the case
of different measurements and measured states in each round. The whole protocol is
summarized in Fig. 4.1:
630 Device independent random number generation
Quadratic expansion protocol
1. User of the randomness expander has a pair of devices, each with 2 inputs and
2 outputs. Both devices are isolated and cannot communicate outside of the
lab and between each other. User also has an initial random string t = (t1, t2),
divided into two substrings t1 and t2. She chooses a security parameter δ to
bound the probability of the adversary to cheat.
2. User uses string t1 to produce inputs into the devices d = (x1, y1; . . . ;xn, yn).
Each of the inputs is generated independently according to a probability joint
distribution pXY . For each input pair (xi, yi) the user records the outcomes of
the devices (ai, bi) and thus creates a string of outputs r = (a1, b1; . . . ; an, bn).
3. From the strings d and r the user computes IobsCHSH (Eq. (4.6)), then using
IobsCHSH and δ she computes ε via Eq. (4.7). With these values she can bound
the min-entropy of the output string r given inputs d via Eq. (4.8).
4. User applies a randomness extractor with the string t2 as a seed to convert the
string r into a string r¯ of length O(nf(IobsCHSH − ε)), which is close to uniform
and uncorrelated to adversary’s information. The final random string is (t, r¯).
Fig. 4.1. Quadratic expansion protocol of Pironio et. al. [70].
In order to asses the efficiency of the scheme, we need to examine the length of the
final random string. It can be shown that if n is large enough, it is possible to start
with a short random seed of the length O(
√
n log2
√
n) to produce a string of length
O(n). It turns out that to achieve such quadratic expansion it is crucial not to choose
measurement settings with uniform probability. Indeed, if the user chooses one of the
possible inputs with probability 1 − 3q and the other three with probability q, with q
small, the randomness required to generate the inputs is then equal to nO(−q log2 q).
Choosing q = 1/
√
n thus requires O(
√
n log2
√
n) random bits. On the other hand,
amount of randomness in the string r is given by (4.8), with ε equal to O(1). Hence, for
a constant Bell violation the string r contains O(n) bits of randomness. The protocol
thus achieves quadratic expansion.
Protocol introduced by Pironio et. al. [70] was the first protocol with rigorous proof
of security and what is more, in order to show the concept of device independent ran-
domness expansion is viable with current technology, the authors also implemented their
protocol and were able to obtain 42 new random bits with 99% confidence. However, the
protocol still had some weaknesses to be fixed. First of all the protocol is not proven to
be universally composable against a full quantum adversary – the bound (4.8) is derived
against adversaries that measure their quantum systems prior to the randomness extrac-
tion. Recall that full quantum adversaries might store the side-information in a quantum
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memory and measure their systems later, perhaps after a part of the extracted string has
been revealed (as a part of another cryptographic protocol, e.g. privacy amplification).
Secondly, this protocol rises a question, whether another, more efficient protocol can be
designed – a protocol that achieves exponential, or even unbounded expansion. Both of
these questions have been resolved in subsequent work and we will examine them in the
rest of this section.
4.2 Exponential expansion
We will present the protocol of Vidick and Vazirani [91]. In order to do so we will first
reformulate the CHSH inequality in a language of game theory. Alice and Bob are now
a non-communicating players that receive an input x, y ∈ {0, 1} and reply with bits
a, b ∈ {0, 1}. They win if and only if
a⊕ b = x ∧ y, (4.9)
where ⊕ is sum modulo 2 and ∧ is the logical AND. This is actually only a differently
expressed CHSH inequality (3.10). All classical strategies (i.e. any strategy Alice and
Bob could agree on before they start playing) achieve at most 75% probability to win the
game. On the other hand, if Alice and Bob share an entangled state, they can achieve
better probability of winning – about 85%. These properties of quantum and classical
strategies are a simple corollary of the CHSH inequality presented in the previous section.
The protocol for randomness expansion now consists of playing multiple rounds of the
game with two devices with random inputs and determining the probability of winning
from the outcomes. If the estimated probability to win is more than 75%, the devices
have used a quantum strategy, which implies that some randomness was produced. The
difficult part is again to make these statements quantitative.
First of all let us discuss a protocol that can achieve exponential expansion against
an adversary without quantum memory. The first crucial idea to design such protocol
was already hinted in the quadratic expansion protocol of previous subsection – do not
choose inputs into devices with uniform distribution. In the Vazirani-Vidick protocol
authors use default inputs, i.e. x = y = 0, into the devices in a significant portion of
the rounds and use random choices of x and y only occasionally, in order to check if the
devices use quantum strategy. This can obviously help to use shorter initial random seed,
however makes testing of the CHSH condition more cumbersome. For example consider
a protocol in which only a small fraction of the inputs is chosen randomly, while the rest
of the inputs is fixed to x = 0 and y = 0. If the devices only output a = 0 and b = 0
in every round, the CHSH condition would be satisfied with probability almost 1, on
average over the whole protocol. This demonstrates the need for a more sophisticated
way to check the CHSH condition, as we will see in the following protocol.
Let n be the length of a random string to be generated and δ a security parameter.
Divide all the runs in the protocol into m = Cdn log(1/δ)e blocks of the length k =
10dlog2 ne, where C is a large constant. Inputs in a given block consist of a fixed pair
(x, y) repeated in the whole block. For most of the blocks the input is (0, 0) and only
for randomly chosen blocks, called Bell blocks, the inputs (x, y) are chosen with uniform
probability. The number of Bell blocks is approximately ∆ = 1000dlog(1/δ)e. Authors
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Exponential expansion
1. Compute ` = Cn and ∆ = 1000dlog(1/δ)e from inputs n and δ. Set k =
d10 log2 `e and m = ∆`.
2. Choose the Bell blocks T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} by randomly selecting each block with
probability 1/`. Repeat, for i = 1, . . . ,m
(a) If i /∈ T , then
i. Set (x, y) = (0, 0) as inputs for k consecutive rounds of CHSH test
and collect the outputs (a, b).
ii. If a⊕ b has more than d0.16ke 1’s then reject and abort the protocol,
otherwise continue.
(b) If i ∈ T , then
i. Choose (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random and use it as input for
k rounds of CHSH test. Collect the outputs (a, b).
ii. If a ⊕ b differs from x ∧ y in more than d0.16ke rounds, reject and
abort the protocol. Otherwise continue.
3. If all steps accepted, then accept.
Fig. 4.2. Exponential expansion protocol of Vidick and Vazirani [91].
introduced the blocks of input in order to check the CHSH condition (4.9) in a more
sophisticated way – the condition needs to be fulfilled by at least 84% of outputs in each
block in order for the protocol to pass the CHSH test.
The formal statement guarantees the existence of a constant C, such that the following
holds. Let A and B be random variables describing the output of the two devices used
for randomness generation and PCHSH an event in which the protocol passes the CHSH
test. For all large enough n at least one of the following holds:
Either H∞(B|PCHSH) ≥ n (4.10)
Or Pr[PCHSH ] ≤ δ (4.11)
We will omit the proof of this statement, and direct the reader to the original paper [91].
With this qualitative statement we now can present the protocol, which is described in
Fig. 4.2.
Notice that only O(∆ log `) bits of the initial randomness were used. In step (2.)
O(∆ log `) bits were used to choose the Bell blocks and in step (2.b.i.) 2 bits per Bell
block of randomness were used, i.e. O(2∆ log `) bits altogether. Taking into account
O(log n) bits needed for randomness extraction, we only need O(log n) bits of initial
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randomness to produce O(n) bits of perfect randomness. This protocol however is again
secure only against an adversary without quantum memory.
4.3 Exponential expansion against full quantum adversaries
In order to achieve full composable security against quantum adversaries we need two
ingredients. First of all we need to grant the adversary a quantum system ρE , possibly
entangled to the devices used for the Bell test and a protocol that can guarantee that the
outputs of the Bell test contain some entropy even conditioned on this quantum system.
This is not a trivial task, especially in the composable security setting, where part of
the produced string can later be revealed. It been shown that after revealing part of
the generated random string, as in the case in some cryptographic protocols – privacy
amplification in quantum key distribution being the prime example – the measurement
of the system ρE enables the prediction of the rest of the string with inverse polynomial
probability [91]. This is much higher than the inverse exponential probability that is
available by measuring ρE without any advice bits.
The second ingredient is a randomness extractor which is secure even in the presence
of quantum side information. We have already discussed existence of such extractors in
Subsection 2.4.
The authors of [91] were able to construct a protocol with desired properties, using
a modified CHSH game. In the game each of the players receives one of three possible
inputs, which correspond to three measurement settings used in the CHSH game. They
are labeled (A, 0), (A, 1), (B, 0), where (A, 0) denotes the measurement Alice would per-
form in a CHSH test, if her input was 0 and similarly for the others. The honest strategy
is to perform measurements and use the state as in honest CHSH inequality as defined
in Subsection 3.2. Important properties are that whenever x = y, the expected results
are a = b, whenever x = (A, 1) and y = (A, 0), the outcomes are expected to be equal
with probability 12 and whenever x = (A, 0) and y = (B, 0), then according to the CHSH
game, about 85% of the outcomes are expected to be the equal. Any other combination
of settings does not appear in the protocol.
The protocol is again performed in m blocks of size k. Most of the blocks have
constant input (A, 0) and a randomly chosen subset T ⊆ {1, . . .m} of Bell blocks has
inputs chosen uniformly at random – Alice gets either (A, 0) or (A, 1) and Bob gets either
(A, 0) or (B, 0). The protocol takes as an input n – the number of bits to be produced,
and the security parameter δ. The quantitative claim uses additional constants α, γ, `
and C, which can be directly calculated from n and δ, in order to calculate the number
and length of the blocks. Let α, γ > 0, α = − log δ and γ ≤ 1/(10+8α). Set C = d100αe,
and ` = n1/γ . Let PCHSH be an event in which the protocol output is accepted and B
′
a random variable describing Bob’s output bits conditioned on PCHSH . Let ρE be an
arbitrary quantum system, possibly entangled with devices executing the protocol. Then
for large enough n at least one of the following holds
Either H∞(B′|ρE) ≥ n (4.12)
Or Pr[PCHSH ] ≤ δ. (4.13)
The full protocol is described in Fig. 4.3.
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Exponential expansion against full quantum adversaries
1. Given δ and n, compute ` and C. Set k = d10 log2 `e and m = C` log2 ` .
2. Choose T ⊆ {1, . . .m} uniformly at random by choosing each block indepen-
dently with probability 1/`.
3. Repeat for i = 1, . . . ,m:
(a) If i /∈ T , then
i. Set x = y = (A, 0) and choose x, y as inputs for k consecutive steps.
Collect all outputs a and b.
ii. If a 6= b abort the protocol, otherwise continue.
(b) If i ∈ T , then
i. Pick x ∈ {(A, 0), (A, 1)} and y ∈ {(A, 0)(B, 0)} uniformly at random,
and use x, y as an input in next k consecutive rounds. Collect the
outputs a and b.
ii. If either x = y and a = b; or y = (B, 0) and a ⊕ b = x ∧ y in more
than d0.84ke positions or x = (A, 1) and y = (A, 0) and a and b differ
in d0.49ke − d0.51ke positions then continue. Otherwise abort the
protocol.
4. If all steps accepted, then accept.
Fig. 4.3. Exponential expansion protocol of Vidick and Vazirani [91] secure against full quantum
adversaries.
Let us analyze the length of a random seed needed in the protocol. To choose the
set T , we need O(log3 `) bits. In each of the Bell blocks, the number of bits needed to
choose the inputs is 4. All in all we need O(log3 `) bits of randomness to produce O(`γ)
bits, where γ is a constant depending directly on the security parameter δ.
The protocols we just presented managed to improve the original proposal [70] in both
providing super-polynomial expansion and security against full quantum adversaries.
However, their drawback is that they are not robust. Notice that in both protocols the
tolerated deviation from the full quantum strategy is very low – by using honest quantum
strategy the devices can fulfill the CHSH condition (4.9) in about 85% of the rounds and
the accepted success rate in the protocol is only 84%. This deems the protocols to be
unpractical. This issue was later addressed by Miller and Shi [60], who designed a robust
protocol with exponential expansion secure against quantum adversaries, which, as we
will see in the next section, is suitable for protocol concatenation.
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Fig. 4.4. The adversarial system of D0 is colored gray in the picture and the adversarial system
of D1 is dashed. Original seed S is secure against adversarial system of D0. Input into D1 is d0,
which is not secure against the whole adversarial system of D1, namely it is not secure against
D0. If it can still be used, then expansion protocol D1 is input secure.
4.4 Concatenation of protocols and unbounded expansion
After having designed a randomness expansion protocol, one of the most natural questions
is if several expansion devices D0, D1, . . . , Dn can be chained together such that output
of device Di – almost perfectly random string – is used as input into device Di+1. In this
way the resulting output could be much longer with multiple devices, ultimately leading
to unbounded expansion.
The concatenation idea was present in the work on randomness expansion from the
beginning [21, 70], but was seriously analyzed for the first time by Fehr et. al. [33].
They used concatenation with quadratically expanding protocol secure against adversary
holding classical information in order to obtain polynomially expanding protocol. We
will examine their protocol in more detail as it nicely demonstrates the difficulties of
expansion protocol concatenation.
First of all, let us split the expansion protocol into two components – expansion and
extraction. The expanding component uses black-box devices and if successful, produces
a string with high min-entropy towards both the adversary and the input, which is not
necessarily uniformly distributed. The extraction component takes this string with high
entropy and transforms it into the outcome of the protocol – a string that is almost
uniform towards the adversary. Note that both components require private seed S – a
string uniform towards both the device and the adversary.
Let us now again consider randomness expansion devices D0 and D1 and suppose
that the whole seed S was used as an input into device D0 to maximize the length of
it’s output d0. The adversarial system for the device D0 consists of the system ρE (the
system the adversary holds) and system ρD1 (internal system of D1). Since the original
seed S is secure against both of these systems as well as internal system ρD0 of D0, the
output d0 is also secure against ρD1 and ρE . Now we would like to use d0 as an input
into device D1. The adversarial system for the device D1 consists of ρE and ρD0 . Note
that device D0 can hold a whole copy of d0 in it’s memory, therefore d0 is secure against
ρE and ρD1 , but not ρD0 (see Fig. 4.4). Can we still use it as a seed for the device D1?
If the answer is yes, we call the protocol input secure.
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S
D0 D1
s0 = d0
E(si, oi)
oi si
E(si+1, oi+1)
si+1
oi+1
CHSH CHSH
di−1
...
di
di+1
...
d2
Fig. 4.5. A schematic drawing of concatenation protocol of Fehr et. al. [33]. The protocol first
inputs the first part of the seed s0 into the device D0. Then the devices are alternated such that
the outcome oi of the expansion part in i
th round is extracted with the use of a fresh seed si,
before being used as input into i+ 1st round. After k rounds the output of the whole protocol is
obtained.
Fehr et. al. [33] designed a protocol, for which they have proven input security of
the expansion part under the assumption of an classical adversary. Unfortunately they
haven’t been able to show input security for the extraction part. However, even in
this setting they could use the protocol concatenation considering only two alternating
independent devices in order to achieve their goal of polynomial expansion. Let us label
the two devicesD0 andD1. Considering the model with the classical adversary we assume
that the devices D0 and D1 are not entangled together. Part of initial seed S, which is
independent of the adversary and both devices, is used with device D0. Since D1 holds
only classical information about D0, the output of D0 is guaranteed to be almost random
to D1. As stated earlier, expansion component of D1 will output raw string with high
min-entropy towards both the adversary and D0, even though it’s input wasn’t secure
against D0. However it is necessary to take the seed for the extraction part of D1 from
the original seed S. In this way the two devices can alternate until fresh seeds for the
extractors are available and thus jointly create an output much longer than the original
protocol (see Fig. 4.5).
For a long time it was an open question whether a full input secure expansion protocol
exists.
This question was concurrently solved by both Coudron and Yuen [24] and Miller
and Shi [60]. Coudron and Yuen proposed a protocol conceptually similar to that of
Fehr. et. al. [33]. The protocol is alternating between two expansion devices D0 and
D1 running the quantum proof protocol of Vazirani and Vidick [91]. What makes the
whole protocol input secure is the fact that each output of an expansion protocol is first
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V V0 V V1
di−1
... di
di+1
...
RUV0 RUV1
S = d0
d2
Fig. 4.6. Concatenation protocol of Coudron and Yuen [24]. The protocol uses two sub-protocols.
The first one, denoted V V is the Vazirani and Vidick protocol introduced in Subsection 4.3
and the second one, denoted RUV is an input secure protocol of Reichardt et. al. [75]. The
concatenation protocol is initialized with a random seed S and then the devices alternate in a
way depicted in the scheme, until the desired number of rounds is reached.
decoupled (see Fig. 4.6) from both devices D0 and D1 by another protocol taken from
the work of Reichardt et. al. [75] (refered to as RUV protocol). The RUV protocol
is input secure and therefore produces a random string even if it’s seed is secure only
against internal state of the device running the protocol. The disadvantage of the RUV
protocol is that it’s output is actually shorter than it’s input. Nevertheless, the shrinking
factor is only polynomial, therefore coupling it with exponentially expanding Vazirani
and Vidick protocol provides the desired unbounded expansion with only four devices.
The solution of Miller and Shi [60] heavily leans on a result by Chung et. al. [19],
mainly their equivalence lemma. The equivalence lemma is very powerful and somewhat
surprisingly dodges the problem of input secure extractor components. It treats the
expansion protocol as a whole and shows that any expansion protocol with globally secure
seed retains the same parameters if used with only a device secure seed. This lemma
therefore automatically allows them to use any expansion protocol in an alternating way
without any other assumptions (see Figure 4.7).
4.5 Experimentally feasible adversaries
To finish the review of the randomness expansion protocols we mention a set of papers
that deal with a slightly different view on the topic of device independence.
In this view the device independence is motivated by the fragility of quantum devices
that might easily lead to imperfect functioning rather then by an adversary in the system.
Thus here we relax our assumption from the all powerful adversary (within given limi-
tations) to a model imperfect devices. Instead, the devices are expected to be designed
and constructed in an honest way, but might malfunction. But this malfunctioning is
limited to carrying out the expected tasks in a wrong way (or not carrying them out
at all) rather than performing completely new tasks. Thus, if there is e.g. no quantum
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D0 D1
di−1
... di
di+1
...
S = d0
d2
Fig. 4.7. Miller and Shi [60] concatenation of expansion protocols. They have shown that any
device obtaining security with globally secure seed remains secure if used with seeds secure against
the device only. This fact allows for very simple alternation of two independent devices, resulting
in unbounded expansion.
memory in the design of the protocol, the malfunctioning device will not be able to use
it, as it is technically not possible.
Another motivation for examining this type of protocols comes from the fact that it
is arguably very difficult to guarantee that the adversarially constructed devices do not
contain classical transmitters of any sort. An dishonest provider would probably just
install a device that would broadcast the final key in a classical way and not bother to
break the security on the quantum level. Thus it has more sense to trust the provider to
be honest, but possibly might be slovenly in the production process.
Let us first mention work of Pironio and Massar [71] and Fehr et. al. [33]. Both
papers used tools from [70] and improved their analysis of security against classical side
information. Moreover Fehr et. al. [33] developed the concatenation idea described in the
previous section and Pironio and Massar [71] argued why classical security is sufficient
in real world expansion protocols.
Even though their protocols aren’t secure in full generality they still provide a number
of very useful properties. Traditional random number generators suffer from several
problems, which device independent randomness expansion can successfully overcome.
One of the most severe problems is monitoring the quality of the output. Deterioration
of the output quality of random number generators is difficult to detect and should be
monitored constantly. As we have seen, this is an implicit property of the randomness
expansion protocols – all the produced data had to pass a Bell test. Another advantage
is the estimation of entropy, which does not rely on any statistical test – violating a Bell
inequality is the proof of randomness as such.
The work with similar adversarial setting was later continued in work by Bancal et. al.
[5, 4] and Nieto-Silleras et. al. [66] who suggest techniques to certify more randomness
from the correlations observed during a non-locality test.
In [82] a different relaxation of the assumptions was considered and authors con-
structed a protocol, in which the devices used are allowed a small amount of communica-
tion and authors of [23] gave an upper and lower bound on expansion rates for different
types of protocols.
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5 Randomness amplification
In this section, we will focus on a task closely related to randomness expansion. Recall
that one of the crucial assumptions in randomness expansion protocols is the existence of
an independent random seed, which is used to choose the measurement settings in a Bell
test and as a seed for randomness extractor during the classical post-processing. The
random and independent measurement choice corresponds to the assumption (3.4), which
states that the preparation of the measured state does not depend on the measurement
settings. Relaxation of this assumption can be modeled by granting the adversary some
information about the random seed. In different context, this can be seen as a limitation
on the “free will” of the experimentalist; a line of research is devoted to this topic, see
e.g. [46, 68, 49]
The first difficulty stemming from partial information about the choice of measure-
ment settings is that the programming of the devices can depend on them. Therefore
the adversary can prepare the devices to expect some inputs more often than the others,
hence their internal state is not fully independent on the inputs. The second difficulty is
the post processing. In the case of randomness expanders, the initial random seed was
split into two independent parts, one used for the measurement choices, the other for
post-processing via randomness extractors, which require independent random seed to
function properly. This is no longer possible in amplification scenario – we cannot split
the initial weakly random seed into two independent parts. Because post-processing
is more difficult, most of the existing amplification protocols produce only single inde-
pendent random bit per run. Only recently, thanks to the development of input-secure
unbounded expansion, protocols that produce more bits per run have been discovered.
In this section we review amplification protocols for Santha-Vazirani weak sources
and then protocols for min-entropy sources.
5.1 Santha-Vazirani amplification with many devices.
The first randomness amplification protocol of Colbeck and Renner [22] that appeared
in the literature was able to amplify any SV-source (see Def. 2) with ε < (
√
2− 1)2/2 ≈
0.086, under the assumption of quantum adversaries. Under the stronger assumption
of no signaling adversaries, the protocol can amplify SV-sources with ε < 0.058. Their
protocol uses a two party chained Bell inequality [15]. In Grudka et. al. [39] analysis of
two party protocol against no-signaling adversary was improved and it was shown that
any SV source with ε < 0.0961 can be amplified.
The reason why the first protocols weren’t able to amplify SV-sources for arbitrary
ε > 12 is that this task requires a very specific Bell inequality.
First of all, to be able to design a protocol for full randomness amplification, it is
crucial to use Bell inequalities, which can be maximally violated by quantum mechanics.
To see this consider a particular cheating strategy. The adversary programs the devices
with an optimal classical strategy. Using such strategy some inputs will be compatible
with the optimal violations and some will not. However, the adversary is assumed to
be able to influence the input randomness up to the Santha-Vazirani parameter ε and
might set the classical strategy in each run in such a way that the outcomes will be
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incompatible with the set of least probable inputs only. It can easily be seen that the
worse the randomness is (the higher the ε), the more successful this strategy becomes,
as the “bad” inputs become less probable. If the parameter of the SV source ε increases
above some threshold, the probability to successfully provide compatible outcomes with
this classical strategy reaches the quantum limit. This attack is no longer possible when
the maximal attainable violation is observed, because the adversary is forced to provide
correlations attaining the maximum violation in every round of the protocol, which is
impossible with classical strategy. An example of Bell inequality with this property is
the GHZ inequality introduced in Subsection 3.2.
The second property of Bell tests required to design full amplification protocol is
relevant if we want to obtain security against non-signaling adversaries. What we are
looking for is a function that can post-process the outcomes of measurement into a single
non-deterministic bit. It turns out this is not elementary and even inequalities fulfilling
the first property of maximum quantum violation don’t have to have this property. For
example, it can be shown that for every function post-processing the outcomes of the
GHZ inequality, there is a non-signaling distribution, which fully violates the inequality,
but fixes the outcomes of such function.
This is the reason why a breakthrough article [36] introducing the first amplification
protocol able to amplify arbitrary SV-source with ε < 1/2 consider the following 5-party
inequality coming from a family of inequalities generalizing the GHZ inequality – so
called Mermin inequalities [58].
Let us denote the inputs for the five parties ~x = (x1, . . . , x5) and the outputs ~a =
(a1, . . . , a5), with xi, ai ∈ {0, 1}. We will express the inequality as a linear combination
of the non–signaling probabilities p(~a|~x), governing the outputs, given the inputs. The
inequality than reads:∑
~a,~x
c~a,~x · p(~a|~x) ≥ 6, (5.1)
with linear coefficients
c~a,~x = (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ⊕ a4 ⊕ a5)δ~x∈X0 + (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ⊕ a4 ⊕ a5 ⊕ 1)δ~x∈X1 (5.2)
where
δ~x∈Xi =
{
1 if ~x ∈ Xi
0 if ~x /∈ Xi,
and
X0 = {(10000), (01000), (00100), (00010), (00001), (11111)}
X1 = {(00111), (01011), (01101), (01110), (10011), (10101),
(10110), (11001), (11010), (11100)}.
Note that only half of the possible inputs appear in the inequality. The maximum non-
signaling violation of this inequality corresponds to the situation with left hand side of
Eq. 5.1 equal to zero and it can be achieved by a quantum strategy of measuring state
|GHZ〉5 = 1√2 (|00000〉+ |11111〉) with measurements σx and σy.
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Santha-Vazirani amplification protocol with many devices
1. Use X to generate N quintuplets of bits ~x1, . . . , ~xn, which are used as inputs
into 5N devices. The devices outputs are labeled ~a1, . . . ,~an.
2. Quintuplets that are not valid inputs for 5-party Mermin inequality are dis-
carded. If less than N/3 quintuplets remain, abort.
3. The rest of the quintuplets are organized into Nb blocks each having Nd quin-
tuplets. One of the blocks is chosen, randomly according to the random source
X, to be the distillation block.
4. Check, if all the non-distilling blocks maximally violate 5-party Mermin in-
equality. If not, abort the protocol.
5. Produce the bit k = f(maj(~a1), . . . ,maj(~aNd)), where f is the distillation
function, (~a1, . . . ,~aNd) are outputs in the distillation block and maj(~a) is the
majority function of the first three outputs of quintuplet a.
Fig. 5.1. Santha-Vazirani amplification protocol of Galego et. al. [36].
The post-processing function required to obtain non-deterministic bits from the out-
comes of the measurement here is the majority function maj(~a) of the the first three
parties involved in the protocol. It can be shown that for every non-signaling distribu-
tion fully violating the inequality, the predictability of the majority function is at most
3/4. The property of the majority function can be interpreted as an amplification pro-
cedure of an arbitrary SV source with ε < 12 into an SV-source with ε =
1
4 . To finish the
protocol it needs to be equipped with two additional components.
The first of them is an estimation procedure to make sure that the untrusted devices
indeed do yield the required Bell violation and the other thing is a procedure f that
can transform sufficiently many bits with bias ε = 14 generated in the Bell experiment
into a random bit with bias ε arbitrary close 0. The second task looks to be in direct
contradiction with the result of Santha and Vazirani [78], which claims it is impossible
to classically extract bits from such a source. The reason it is possible here is that the
bits are produced in a quantum process and the Santha-Vazirani classification (the value
of ε) does not sufficiently describe all the properties of these bits. In other words, the
bits do contain an additional structure. Using the techniques of [53], the authors of the
protocol were able to show the existence of such function f . Unfortunately, even though
the existence of such function is proven, the precise construction is yet unknown.
The protocol uses as a resources an SV-source X with arbitrary ε < 12 and N 5-partite
GHZ states (see Fig. 5.1).
The authors have shown in a rather complicated proof that the probability pguess of
the adversary to guess the output bit k correctly, using all the available information, can
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be upper bounded as:
pguess ≤ 1
2
+
3
√
Nd
2
[
αNd + 2N
log2(1/2+ε)
b (32β(1/2− ε)−5)Nd
]
, (5.3)
where α and β are real numbers such that 0 < α < 1 < β.
Note that εf =
3
√
Nd
2
[
αNd + 2N
log2(1/2+ε)
b (32β(1/2− ε)−5)Nd
]
is the bias of the
newly produced bit, which can be made arbitrary close to zero (pguess can be made
arbitrarily close to 12 ) by setting Nb = (32β(1/2 − ε)−5)2Nd/| log2(1/2+ε)| and increasing
Nd, so that NdNb ≥ N/3. Notice that this protocol works only in a noiseless setting and
the number of steps and devices increases as the εf of the produced bit approaches 0.
5.2 Santha-Vazirani amplification with eight devices.
The work of Gallego et. al. [36] was followed by several results. At first in [61], a
tripartite amplification protocol was presented, which could amplify SV source with
arbitrary ε < 1/2, in a noisy setting in finite time, secure against quantum adversaries.
Subsequently, in a breakthrough paper [14] the authors showed an amplification protocol
secure against non-signaling adversaries for any SV-source with ε < 1/2, which uses only
a finite number of devices and tolerates a constant rate of error. We will review their
protocol in this subsection.
The protocol of Branda˜o et. al. [14] uses two independent non-communicating devices
composed of four non-signaling components to test a 4-partite Bell type inequality with
inputs chosen according to a given Santha-Vazirani source with ε < 12 . The runs of both
devices are divided into blocks of equal lengths. After the necessary number of rounds two
blocks are chosen according to the bits drawn from the given Santha-Vazirani source – one
block from the first device and the second block from the second device. Subsequently,
the violation of the used Bell inequality is calculated from the inputs and outputs of
the devices. If the violation is high enough, a 2-source extractor is applied to the block
outputs in order to create outputs of the protocol. In order to establish the correctness
of the protocol authors have proven three crucial claims.
The first claim is that one can use as little as two devices with four components each.
The main problem here is that in order to justify the use of a two source extractor, it’s
inputs have to be independent. Although at the end of the protocol, the inputs for the
extractor are chosen from two non-communicating devices, they are not trivially inde-
pendent. Correlations between the blocks can be caused by several factors, for example
pre-shared randomness or the fact that their inputs are chosen according to an SV-source
which are generally correlated.
The crucial technique here is the use of a variant of quantum de Finetti theorem
[13]. The quantum de Finetti theorems essentially show us that if a k-partite quantum
state is permutation-symmetric, the reduced state of its subsystems of size l  k is
close to a convex combination of l-partite identical separable quantum states. Moreover,
after conditioning on the measurement outcomes of the rest of the states (the states
that are not part of the small l-partite subsystem in question), the state of the chosen
subsystem collapses into a state that is close to factorized. The permutation symmetry
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can be obtained by simple uniform random choice of the subsystems. Then by the de
Finetti theorem the subsystems are factorized and therefore their measurement outcomes
are uncorrelated. The main problem in this context is to show that similar result holds
even if the subsystems are chosen according to a (arbitrary weak) Santha-Vazirani source
instead of the uniform one.
The second claim is that the violation of the used Bell inequality can certify ran-
domness of the measurement outcomes even if the measurement settings are not chosen
uniformly, but according to an SV-source. Moreover, it is also necessary to quantify the
amount of min-entropy in the outcomes that passed the Bell test in order to use the
appropriate two source extractors.
The third claim is concerned with the use of an appropriate two source extractor at
the end of the protocol. It is important to stress that the authors use a non-explicit
extractor, which is known to exist, but its construction is not generally known yet (i.e.
it is not efficiently constructible – see Subsection 2.3). The reason for this is that recent
two source extractor constructions require both input sources to have relatively high-min
entropy rate as discussed in Subsection 2.3, which is not the case of the measurement
outcomes in the chosen blocks. However, the protocol can be extended to a case with
multiple devices with four components. In such a protocol a multi-source extractor is
used at the end and there are known extractor constructions which require much lower
entropy rate. The price to pay is the increase on the number of non-communicating
devices, which nevertheless stays constant.
In order to introduce the protocol more formally, let us fix the notation. The first
device will be used for N1 = NdN
1
b runs and the second device for N2 = NdN
2
b runs. Each
run is divided into N1b and N
2
b blocks of size Nd respectively The N1 input quadruples
for the first device are denoted ~x1, similarly N2 input quadruples for the second device
are denoted ~u2. Output quadruples are denoted ~a1 and ~a2 respectively.
The Bell inequality used in the protocol has the following form. Each of the four
devices receives one bit input and produces one bit output, therefore the inputs are
labeled ~x = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and outcomes ~a = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. The measurement settings
that appear in the Bell term are divided into two sets
X0 = {0111, 1011, 1101, 1110} and X1 = {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000} (5.4)
The inequality then reads:
∑
~a,~x
c~a,~x· (~a|~x) ≥ 2, (5.5)
with linear coefficients
c~a,~x = (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ⊕ a4)δ~x∈X0 + (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 ⊕ a4 ⊕ 1)δ~x∈X1 (5.6)
where
δ~x∈Xi =
{
1 if ~x ∈ Xi
0 if ~x /∈ Xi,
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Santha-Vazirani amplification with eight devices
1. Divide the measurements of the two devices used in the protocol into N1b and
N2b blocks respectively, such that each block contains Nd measurements. In
other words N1 = N
1
bNd, N2 = N
2
bNd.
2. Use the ε-SV source to choose measurement settings{
~xi1|i ∈ {1, . . . , N1}
}
,
{
~xi2|i ∈ {1, . . . , N2}
}
for two devices composed of
four black boxes each. The devices produce outputs
{
~ai1|i ∈ {1, . . . , N1}
}
and{
~ai2|i ∈ {1, . . . , N1}
}
.
3. Choose at random one of the blocks of size Nd from each device, using bits
from the ε-SV source.
4. Perform an estimation of the violation of the Bell inequality in both blocks
(j = 1,2) by computing the empirical average Lj =
1
Nd
∑
i c~aij ,~xij , where the
sum goes through all inputs and outputs in the chosen block. The protocol is
aborted unless for both of them Lj ≤ ( 12 − ε)4 δ2 (1− µ).
5. Conditioned on not aborting in the previous step apply the inexplicit two source
extractor to the sequence of outputs from the chosen block in each device.
Fig. 5.2. Protocol for Santha-Vazirani source randomness amplification with 8 devices by
Branda˜o et. al. [14].
Local models can achieve minimal value of 2, while there exists a quantum strategy
that achieves the algebraic minimum of 0. Moreover, the authors have shown that there
doesn’t exist any no-signaling distribution that can simultaneously achieve low values of
the Bell term and deterministic outcomes.
In the protocol we will be using empirical average of the Bell term over Nd runs. This
serves the same role as before. We would need infinite time to check the Bell inequality
precisely, so we are using average obtained in each of the blocks instead. Here it is defined
as:
L =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
c~a,~x. (5.7)
If this empirical average is lower than ( 12 − ε)4 δ2 (1−µ) with fixed constants δ, µ > 0, the
outputs of the Nd runs have min-entropy linear in Nd. The whole protocol is shown in
Fig. 5.2.
Note that because this protocol can output more than one bit, it can be concatenated
with one of the input secure expansion protocols in order to obtain unbounded amount
of almost random bits.
Randomness amplification 645
5.3 Min-entropy amplification with many devices
In order to illustrate the complications in the analysis of min-entropy amplification,
let us first recall the crucial difference between Santha-Vazirani sources and min-entropy
sources. The main difference is that any string from a SV-source with ε < 12 has non-zero
probability to appear. As we have discussed in Subsection 2.2.3, this is not the case of
min-entropy sources. This fact creates many difficulties. As an example consider the case
of GHZ scenario (see Subsection 3.2). If one of the four possible measurement settings is
known by the adversary to have zero probability to be used, the classical deterministic
strategy to violate the GHZ inequality exists. Note that this is not only the case of the
GHZ inequality, but similar property is inherent in every Bell-type scenario as shown
by Le et. al. [85]. This is perhaps the main reason why min-entropy amplification took
longer time to develop than it’s Santha-Vazirani counterpart.
Let us start by a protocol for block-min entropy sources (defined in Subsection 2.2.3)
by Bouda, Paw lowski, Pivoluska and Plesch [9]. The protocol is based on GHZ game
introduced in Subsection 3.2.
First of all note that in principle we need only two bits to generate an input into
a GHZ test, as only four out of eight input bit combinations appear in the inequality.
The simplest approach would be for the protocol to simply take a block of size n from
the weak source, divide it into n2 two bit substrings and use these two bit substrings to
create inputs for n2 rounds of the GHZ test. Unfortunately this approach does not work.
Recall that in order to use deterministic strategy in a single run of a GHZ game, it is
sufficient, if one of the inputs have 0 probability to be used. Thus the adversary can
choose a probability distribution for the block source in such a way that only three out
of four possible values appear in each two bit substring. Such source would allow the
adversary to use a deterministic strategy to win the GHZ game in every round. The
the min-entropy rate R of this distribution is log2(3)2 and therefore with this strategy
amplification is impossible for sources with R ≤ log2(3)2 .
The main idea of the protocol construction that allows us to go around this difficulty
is to first use several specific hash functions depending on each bit of the block in order to
generate inputs into multiple independent devices performing the GHZ test. The reason
why this trick works is that if the inputs are chosen in this way for multiple independent
devices with the use of the suitable set of hash functions, it is much more demanding to
achieve probability 0 of some input for all the devices simultaneously. To illustrate how
hashing can improve the performance see Fig. 5.3.
It might seem that to lower the required min-entropy, using simply more hash func-
tions to create the inputs into more independent GHZ testing devices will suffice. How-
ever, it is only partially true and this method has it’s limits. Whenever less than four
out of all possible strings appear, each hash function can output only less than four of
it’s outputs with non-zero probability. Therefore, the only requirement we have is that
each block contains at least two bits of entropy, i.e. it is a (n, 2) block source. Note that
as n goes to infinity, rate of such source goes to 0.
Therefore the first step is to find a set of hash functions H that ensures that every
quadruple of the possible block outputs of size n will be hashed to four different two bit
strings by at least one hash function h ∈ H. Such construction ensures that at least one
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Fig. 5.3. An illustration of the “hash trick” for blocks of length n = 3. We use two independent
devices with two hash functions. At least 3 out of 8 source outputs have to be fixed in order to
win both GHZ games with deterministic strategy with probability 1, which is mote than 2 out of
8 required with the use of a single device.
of the many independent GHZ devices paired with the hash functions has a distribution
on the inputs that prevents it from winning the GHZ game with probability 1 with
deterministic strategy.
This can be easily achieved by considering the set of all hash functions h : {0, 1}n 7→
{0, 1}2, however the size of such set |H| = m is impractically large (m = 4n in this case),
as a single function in fact “covers” several quadruples (see Fig. 5.4). On the other hand
for large n one hash function covers as many as 9% of all four-tuples, independently of
n. So the size of an optimal set of hash functions might not depend on n at all.
In what follows we show a construction of H with m polynomially large in n.
Let us consider a sequence of random variables Z = (Z0, . . . , ZN−1) such that Zi ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}. The outcomes of such a random experiment areN -position sequences from the
set {0, 1, 2, 3}N . It is easy to see that each such sequence specifies uniquely a particular
function h : {0, ..., N − 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}, and vice versa. Since now on we will use them
interchangeably.
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Fig. 5.4. For each quadruple of n bit strings we need a hash function to map it to four different
outputs. Several quadruples can share a hash function as demonstrated by function h2 (dashed)
and thus one does not need the full set of all hash functions.
Let us assume that random variables Z satisfy the condition that for every 4–tuple
of positions j0, j1, j2, j3 and every 4-element string z0z1z2z3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 it holds that
Pr
[
Zj0 = z0 ∧ Zj1 = z1 ∧ Zj2 = z2 ∧ Zj3 = z3
]
> 0. (5.8)
Note that for our purposes even a weaker assumption on Z is sufficient: It is enough
if for every 4–tuple of positions j0, j1, j2, j3 there exists at least one 4-element string
z0z1z2z3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 with all z0, z1, z2, z3 begin mutually different and satisfying (5.8).
However, the stronger condition will make it easier to find a suitable set.
Let us denoteH = {z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}N such that P [Z = z] > 0}. Using the probabilistic
method we see that for each 4-tuple of positions j0, j1, j2, j3 and every 4-element string
z0z1z2z3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 there exists a function h ∈ H such that
h(j0) = z0 ∧ h(j1) = z1 ∧ h(j2) = z2 ∧ h(j3) = z3. (5.9)
The number of functions in H is the same as the number of (nonzero probability) sample
space elements of Z. It remains to construct Z with a sample space as small as possible.
In order to do so, we will need the following definition and theorem.
Definition 18 (s-wise δ-dependence). Binary random variables (Z0, . . . , ZN−1) are s-
wise δ-dependent iff for all subsets S ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1}, |S| ≤ s
||U|S| −DS ||1 ≤ δ, (5.10)
where U|S| is a uniform distribution over |S|-bit strings and DS is a marginal distribution
over subset of variables specified by S.
Theorem 1 ([63]). The logarithm of the cardinality of the sample space needed to con-
struct N s-wise δ-dependent random variables is O
(
s+ log logN + log 1δ
)
.
In our case we are interested in s = 4. Let us consider two sequences X0, . . . , XN−1
and Y0, . . . , YN−1 of binary 4-wise δ-dependent random variables, both sequences being
mutually independent. Let Zi = 2Xi + Yi.
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As both X and Y are δ-dependent, their distance from the uniform distribution for
every subset of size at most 4 is at most δ. Assuming there is a zero probability for at
least one binary string out of {0, 1}4 at positions (0, 1, 2, 3) we have that the distance of
such a distribution from the uniform distribution is at least 2× 2−4 = 2−3.
Hence, assuring that δ < 2−3 we find that for each 4 positions there is a nonzero
probability of every 4-bit sequence appearing. Hence, for the sequence of random vari-
ables Z it holds that in every 4-tuple of positions every string out of {0, 1, 2, 3}4 appears
with non-zero probability.
In our case we need two independent sets of N = 2n 4-wise 1/8-dependent random
variables, resulting in a sample space of O(nc), bearing the desired polynomial construc-
tion.
Another preliminary result we need to show is a form of rigidity theorem for the GHZ
game. Rigidity theorems for Bell-type experiments show that if the value of the experi-
ment is close to being optimal, so is the strategy that achieved it. In our case, the claim
is that if the GHZ game is won with probability 1, then the optimal quantum strategy
has been used, which in turn guarantees random outcomes of the measurements. The
exact version of such rigidity for CHSH experiment has been known for some time [54].
It was later followed by the more robust results for more general games (also the GHZ
game), claiming that if the probability of winning is close to 1, then the strategy that
achieved it is close to the optimal one [59, 56]. Such theorems show us that the GHZ test
behaves “nicely” in the sense that it is impossible to achieve a slightly suboptimal vio-
lation with strategies that are dramatically different from the optimal one and therefore
even suboptimal violation is a witness of randomness being produced.
We used the following computational form of a rigidity theorem obtained by semi-
definite programing, which is concerned only about the produced randomness. The
formal statement is the following:
Take an arbitrarily long linearly ordered sequence of t Mermin devices D1...Dt with
uniform distribution on inputs, and each device knows inputs and outputs of its pre-
decessors, but devices cannot signal to its predecessors. Let us assume that the inputs
of devices are described by random variables XY Z1, . . . , XY Zt, and the outputs by
ABC1, . . . , ABCt. Then there exists a function f(ε) such that if the value of the Mermin
variable (3.17) using uniform inputs is at least vu ≥ f(ε), then the output bit At has a
bias at most ε conditioned on the input and output of all its predecessors and the adver-
sarial knowledge. This function can be lower bounded by a semidefinite program (SDP)
using any level of the hierarchy discussed in Subsection 3.3. By using the second level of
the hierarchy one can obtain the bound on f(ε) as a function of ε shown in Fig. 5.5.
We can set t = 1 (having just a single device) and get the lower bound on the detection
probability of producing a bit biased by more than ε, which is 1−f(ε). More independent
non-communicating devices can be ordered into any sequence and thus this limit holds
for any of these devices simultaneously.
Now we are armed with all the tools to analyze a single round of the protocol depicted
in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7.
Let us now analyze how the single round protocol works. We will first analyze the
single round protocol, if we restrict the adversary and allow her to use only flat sources
(see Def. 6). In that case only 4 strings appear with positive probability of 14 . For such a
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Fig. 5.5. Depicted is the value of GHZ term v = f(ε) needed to certify the bias of the output bit of
the first device performing the GHZ test is at most ε. This can be seen as a sort of rigidity term
for the GHZ inequality and is one of the main tools in analysis of the protocol by Bouda et. al.[9]
Block source amplification protocol with many devices
1. Obtain a (weakly) random n bit string r from the (n, k) block source.
2. Input into each device Di the 3 bit string xiyizi chosen from set
{111, 100, 010, 001} – each one corresponding to one of the possible outputs
of hi(r) and obtain the outputs ai, bi and ci.
3. Verify whether for each device Di the condition ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci = xi · yi · zi holds.
If this is not true, abort the protocol.
4. Output b =
⊕m
i=1 ai.
Fig. 5.6. Single round protocol for block source amplification by Bouda et. al. [9]. The full
protocol is a simple repetition of the single round protocol, each time with fresh a block from the
block source and new devices. The outcome of the full protocol is an XOR of outcomes from all
the rounds.
weak source our construction of the the set H of hash functions assures that there exists
a function hj ∈ H that has its four outputs uniformly distributed. Thus, inputs for the
corresponding device Dj are uniform on this flat distribution.
Then by our rigidity claim we know that if the adversary wants to achieve bias ε
for the output bit b, she can do so only with probability vu ≤ f(ε) – otherwise the win
condition will not be satisfied in device Dj and the protocol will abort.
More importantly, the set of all (n, 2) distributions is convex and the flat distributions
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(n, k)
r ∈ {0, 1}n
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Fig. 5.7. The block source amplification protocol of Bouda et. al. [9]. The output r of a weak
source is mapped into inputs for independent GHZ tests with the use of hash functions hi coming
from a specially constructed set H. The construction of H guarantees that at least one of the GHZ
tests obtains input distribution that cannot be won with deterministic strategy with probability
1, thus producing almost random outputs with high probability. Since the output Ai of the good
device is independent of other outputs, the XOR of all the outputs has at most the same bias as
Ai.
are exactly all the extremal points of this convex set. Thus any (n, 2) distribution d can be
expressed as a convex combination of at most N (n, 2) flat distributions di (Caratheodory
theorem) as d =
∑N
i=1 pidi for some pi ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1.
The probability that the win condition is fulfilled for a mixed distribution d is then
upper bounded by the weighted sum of successful cheating probabilities of the flat dis-
tributions di. As all these are upper bounded by f(ε), the following statement holds:
vu ≤
N∑
i=1
pivu,i ≤ f(ε), (5.11)
where vu,i is the cheating probability of i-th flat distribution constituting the mixture.
To summarize this part, having any (n, k) source with k ≥ 2, with a single round of
a protocol, we can produce a single bit that is biased at most by ε with the cheating
probability of the adversary f(ε).
However a good protocol should allow the user to choose both the target parameters
of the produced bit – the bias ε  1 and the cheating probability δ  1. The single
round protocol obviously doesn’t fulfill this property, as the only pairs of allowed (ε, δ)
are (ε, f(ε)). This downside can be overcome by repeating the protocol many times, each
time with a new block from the weak source and new set of devices. The outcome of the
protocol is a simple XOR of all the single round protocol outputs.
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If we again consider flat weak sources, we know that in each round of the protocol
there was at least one device that received uniform inputs. All these devices were new,
thus we can order them in any particular time sequence. Using the rigidity result we
see that for each such a sequence the last bit will be biased by no more than ε, unless
the last round was cheated, which can be done with probability upper bounded by f(ε).
To achieve the bias of the product bit at least ε, all the rounds must be cheated, as
any of them can be treated as the last one. Probability of doing this is upper bounded
by f(ε)l. Thus, choosing l > log δlog f(ε) will guarantee the fulfillment of the conditions for
the parameters ε and δ. Using the Caratheodory theorem we can extend this results to
non-flat sources as well.
Summing up, with an (n, k) block source and O
(
log δ
log f(ε)Poly
[
n
⌈
2
k
⌉])
Mermin devices
we can produce a single random bit with bias smaller than ε with probability larger than
1 − δ. For producing more bits we simply repeat the whole procedure: all the bits
produced will have bias smaller than ε conditioned on the bits produced so far, with
linear scaling of resources. Moreover, in the paper [9] we have shown that this protocol
can be extended to a robust protocol, which is able to tolerate certain amount of errors.
To finish this subsections we will briefly mention a protocol for general min-entropy
sources proposed by Chung et. al. [19]. Their idea is very similar to the presented
protocol. The first difference is that they use a different set of hash functions. Namely
they are using a de-randomized strong seeded extractor. Strong extractor can be seen
as a set of hash functions H with a property that for any input source X with enough
min-entropy most of the hash functions hi ∈ H produce almost random outputs. In
practice therefore random choice over H constitutes a good extractor. However, if you
use every function from the set, you can guarantee that for each X with H∞(X) ≥ k,
at least one of them outputs k fully random bits. These bits can be used as an input
into a randomness expansion protocol to produce many random bits. Of course similarly
to the presented protocol the user doesn’t know which hash function produces random
outputs and therefore all of them has to be used with their own independent and non-
communicating device for the expansion part and the outcomes of the expansion protocols
need to be summed together (see Fig. 5.8). Since there is no guarantee that the outputs of
two different hash functions are independent, their result heavily leans on the equivalence
lemma discussed in Subsection 4.4, because we need a guarantee that the expansion
protocol used as a part of the amplification protocol is input secure.
5.4 Min-entropy amplification with a single device
Both presented protocols from the previous subsection require number of devices that
grows with the (block) size of the input source. It is still an open question if protocols
for min-entropy amplification with constant number of devices exist. An important step
towards an answer was made by us in [72]. We examined a protocol that uses a single
GHZ testing device (see Fig. 3.2) taking input from a single min-entropy (2n, 2Rn)
source, with min-entropy rate R. The protocol is depicted in Fig. 5.9.
In the round i two bits Ri1R
i
2 are used to choose one out of four possible input
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(n, k)
r ∈ {0, 1}n
Ext(s0, r) Ext(s1, r) Ext(s2, r) Ext(sm, r)
D0 D1 D2 Dm
B
A1 A2 AmA0
Fig. 5.8. Chung, Shi and Wu protocol for min-entropy amplification [19]. Here si is a binary
m = O(logn) bit representation of i used as a seed into extractor Ext. For any (n, k) distribution
at least one seed si constitutes a good extractor. Output of these extractors is used as an input
into expansion devices Di. As all expansion devices are input secure, their outputs Ai are longer
than the inputs and independent of each other, therefore output string B is almost perfectly
distributed.
Single device protocol for min-entropy amplification
1. Draw a string X = (R11, R
1
2;R
2
1, R
2
2; . . . ;R
n
1 , R
n
2 ) from a (2n, 2Rn) min-entropy
source.
2. Use a single GHZ device to test the GHZ game n times, with input Ri1, R
i
2, R
i
1⊕
Ri2 ⊕ 1 in the ith round.
3. Test if ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci = ai ∧ yi ∧ zi in every round. If this doesn’t hold, abort the
protocol.
4. Conditioned on not aborting the protocol, the output bit is O = Ext(a, b).
Fig. 5.9. Protocol for a single device min-entropy amplification by Plesch and Pivoluska [72]. In
the protocol, Ext is a specific two source extractor, a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) are outputs of the first
box and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) are outputs of the second box used in the GHZ test.
combinations. Let r = r11r
1
2, ..., r
n
1 r
n
2 be a concrete realization of X. Let define Ei(r) as
Ei(r) = − log2
(
max
kl∈{0,1}2
P (Ri1R
i
2 = kl|R11R22, ..., Ri−11 Ri−12 = r11r22, ..., ri−11 ri−12 )
)
.
(5.12)
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This is an important parameter characterizing the amount of entropy in the input of the
ith round. Recall that devices can have memory and thus know the history of previous
inputs and outputs. Therefore, if Ei(r) is less than log2(3), then, conditioned on the
previous inputs, only three out of four two-bit strings might appear as an input into the
devices in the ith round of the protocol and the round – consisting of a GHZ test (see
Fig. 3.2) – can be won with probability 1 with deterministic strategy.
We analyzed the protocol in two specific adversarial scenarios. The first scenario
analyzes the bias of the output bit in a case where the adversary doesn’t want to risk
aborting the protocol at all. The second scenario analyzes the probability of aborting
the protocol in case the adversary wants the protocol to produce a constant bit at all
risk.
In the light of the definition of Ei(r) we can divide the rounds of the protocol into
two types.
1. It holds that Ei(r) > log2(3); in this case P (R
i
1R
i
2 = xiyi|R11R12, ..., Rj1Rj2 =
r11r
1
2, ..., r
j
1r
j
2) > 0 for all four possible values of xi, yi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} and the
only strategy succeeding in the GHZ test with probability 1 is the honest strat-
egy of measuring GHZ states. As discussed before, in this case bits ai and bi are
uniformly distributed and independent of each other as well as all the other pre-
vious inputs xj , yj , zj , j ∈ {1, . . . , i} and outputs aj , bj , cj , j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}.
Probability of any other strategy to fulfill the win condition is bounded away from
1.
2. It holds that Ei(r) ≤ log2(3); there exists a probability distribution P , such that
P (Ri1R
i
2 = xiyi|R11R22, ..., Ri−11 Ri−12 = r11r22, ..., ri−11 ri−12 ) = 0 for at least one pos-
sible value of xi, yi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. In this case there exists a classical strategy
(which can be encoded in the common information λ) that succeeds in the GHZ
test with probability 1.
In the first scenario, the adversary must program the boxes to play an honest strategy
during the rounds of type 1 in order not to abort the protocol, however in the rounds
of type two, the test can be successful even with a deterministic strategy. Worse still,
because the boxes have memory, the deterministic strategy can depend on the outputs
and inputs of the previous rounds, and thus compromise the randomness produced in
the honest rounds.
As an example consider a very general scenario where the resulting bit O is computed
as a sum of partial results from individual rounds oi. Let oi be a result of a round i of
type 1, arbitrarily random. Let j by a subsequent round of type 2. Devices and source
can agree in advance that in round j they will output results obtained in the round i
independently on the inputs. In such case oj = oi and oj ⊕ oi = 0 and thus perfectly
deterministic. The price to pay is the fact that the source had to select a specific outcome
in the round j, which decreases its entropy.
Therefore the analysis of the first scenario boils down to finding out to what extent
can the outcomes of the rounds of type 2 negate any randomness produced in the rounds
of type 1, given a specific entropy of the source. Assume that k out of n rounds are of
type 1. Without the loss of generality we can assume that all k rounds of type 1 are
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realized before n−k rounds of type 2. In fact, this order of rounds gives the adversary the
best possible situation to react in rounds of type 2 on the randomness already produced
in rounds of type 1.
In such ordering we have:
A =
(
~Ak, f
k+1
λ (
~Ak), . . . , f
n
λ ( ~Ak)
)
,
B =
(
~Bk, g
k+1
λ (
~Bk), . . . , g
n
λ( ~Bk)
)
, (5.13)
where ~Ak = (a1, . . . , ak), ~Bk = b1, . . . , bk) are outcomes of the rounds of type 1. Functions
f jλ and g
j
λ, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n are particular strategies in round j of type 2 attempting to
increase the bias of the final bit, depending on the outcomes of the rounds of type 1 and
common information λ. Recall that λ is the common information between the devices,
source and the adversary. All these parties can be correlated only via this random
variable. In a regime where the adversary doesn’t want to risk getting caught at all,
this means that although vectors A and B are generally not independent, they can only
be dependent via λ. Therefore given λ, A and B are independent and their respective
conditional min-entropies are H∞(A|λ) = H∞(B|λ) = k. Thus we can use any two source
extractor Ext to extract the entropy present in A and B. Since A and B are independent
given λ, it holds that (Ext(A,B)|λ) will be distributed according to the properties of
the particular extractor (close to being uniformly distributed given the previously shared
information λ).
We used Hadamard extractor (see Def. 13) in our analysis. Recall that the distance of
the output of the extractor, (Had(A,B)|λ), is guaranteed to be 2(n−H∞(A|λ)−H∞(B|λ)−2)/2-
close to a uniformly distributed bit as long as H∞(A|λ) + H∞(B|λ) ≥ n2 . Therefore as
long as k > n2 , regardless of the strategy employed in rounds of type 2, the output bit
is, at least to some extent, random. Note here that the requirement on k could in prin-
ciple be made lower by using different two-source extractors (see Subsection 2.3.2). For
example Bourgain’s extractor [12] produces non-deterministic bit as long as the sum of
the entropies of A and B is greater than 2n(1/2− α) for some universal constant α and
non-explicit extractors can go as low as k = O(log n) [18].
In the light of the previous analysis we can obtain the upper bound for the min-
entropy rate, for which full cheating (maximum bias with probability of getting caught
equal to 0) is possible. In order to do so, let us represent 2n bit strings that the biased
source X can output with non-zero probability by a graph tree of depth n, where
• each vertex has at most 4 children and each edge from parent to child is labeled by
one of {00, 01, 10, 11},
• each vertex represents prefix of a concrete realization of r with r11, r12, . . . , ri1, ri2
encoded in the edge labels on the path from the root of the tree to the given
vertex,
• each leaf represents a concrete realization of r.
Randomness amplification 655
00 01 10 11
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
round i
round i + 1
round i + 2
Fig. 5.10. An optimal tree representation of the input weak source that potentially enables full
cheating in Pivoluska and Plesch protocol (see Fig. 5.9). Each node in the tree level i represents
the probability distribution of the inputs for ith round. If the node has 4 children, all four inputs
appear with positive probability in ith round and the node is called honest. To win this round
with probability 1 quantum strategy must be used. Otherwise classical deterministic strategy exist
and the node is called dishonest. Optimal tree alternates between honest and dishonest vertices.
Clearly, each vertex has at least
⌈
2Ei(r)
⌉
children. A vertex with 2Ei(r) > 3 will be
called an honest vertex, as in this vertex an honest quantum strategy must be used,
whereas all other vertices will be called dishonest vertices.
To give an upper bound on the min-entropy for which the adversary can fully cheat,
we need to find a tree with a maximal number of leafs, such that for each path from
the root to the leaf the number of honest vertices is smaller or equal to the number of
dishonest vertices. Apparently such a tree can be constructed by alternating between
honest and dishonest vertices along each path (see Fig. 5.10); such tree has
√
12
n
leafs.
Uniform distribution over
√
12
n
leaves maximizes the min-entropy that can be used to
realize such tree, yielding the min entropy rate of RH= log2 (12)/4. For any higher min-
entropy rate, there exists a leaf such that the number of honest vertices on the path
from the root to the leaf is higher than the number of dishonest vertices, therefore the
adversary cannot know the outcome of the protocol with probability 1 without risking
to be caught.
If the actual min-entropy rate of the source used is expressed as R = RH + ε with
arbitrary ε > 0, the probability of every single leaf in the tree will be upper bounded by
p1 = 2
−2nR =
√
12
−n
2−2εn. In such a tree no more than
√
12
n
leaves will be of a form
that allows cheating without risking to be caught, so the overall probability of cheating
success is bounded from above by
pcheat ≤ 2−2εn, (5.14)
thus decreasing to zero exponentially with n. With this probability a bias of the output
bit 12 is achieved, whereas in all other bases the bias is 0, so the resulting bias of the
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Fig. 5.11. By adding a fourth child to a dishonest vertex, it is converted to an honest one
in the zero-error scenario of the Pivoluska and Plesch protocol (see Fig. 5.9). Therefore, all
its children (in the dashed oval) have positive probability to appear – therefore they all produce
random outcomes in zero-error scenario. In the risking scenario, the vertex stays dishonest,
the added (dotted) child leads to abortion of the protocol, however the other children remain
deterministic.
output bit will be
bias(B) ≤ 2−(2εn+1). (5.15)
It is worth to mention that with growing min-entropy rate R the number of cheatable
leaves is in fact decreasing and the actual cheating probability and consequently also the
resulting bias will thus be strictly lower. This is due to the fact that with every extra
leave added to the probability tree, some other leaves will convert from a fully biased to
a perfectly random outcome. This is due to the fact that the extra leaves can be added
only by adding a fourth child to a dishonest vertex, which is in this way converted to an
honest one, resulting into honestness of its leafs (for depiction see Fig. 5.11).
The rate RH = log2(12)/4 is only an upper bound for the amount of min-entropy for
which the full cheating is possible. In fact, there is no constructive attack that would be
possible with such a min-entropy rate. As we have also shown, the optimal implementable
strategy is the one mentioned earlier – in every other round the boxes simple resend the
outcomes of the previous honest round. Such strategy can tolerate less min-entropy than
RH , as the dishonest vertex connected to it’s honest parent by a 11 edge must have only
one child, also labeled 11 (see Fig. 5.12).
Uniform distribution over the leaves of such tree has a min–entropy rate
Rmax = 1/4 log2 10, (5.16)
which is the highest rate for which full cheating is possible – half of the rounds are of
type 1, quantum and honest, and half of the rounds are of type 2, negating the bias
of the output obtained of the previous runs. As soon as R = Rmax + ε, the resulting
bias exponentially converges to zero with the same arguments as used for Hadamard
extractor.
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Fig. 5.12. The optimal achievable cheating strategy in the Pivoluska and Plesch protocol (see
Fig. 5.9) is to repeat outcomes of the previous honest rounds. Random inputs {001, 010, 100} are
interchangeable in the GHZ test, while input {111} needs to be exactly repeated in the dishonest
round.
In a realistic scenario, if it would not be possible for Eve to limit the inputs as needed
for full cheating (i.e. R > log2(12)/4), Eve could simply try to use a classical strategy
and guess the correct outcomes in some of the honest rounds. Let us now analyze, what
would be the probability of successful cheating with such a strategy.
One can model such cheating strategy by adding extra leaves to the fully cheatable
tree (see Fig. 5.11). This can be achieved by adding a fourth edge to some of the dishonest
vertices. In such round, Eve would simply use a classical strategy, which is successful only
in three out of four realizations. Therefore, if this new added edge is actually realized by
the random source, the protocol fails by not satisfying the win condition of the GHZ game
(Eq. (3.18)). The number of leaves for which this strategy is successful stays exactly√
12
n
and all the other leaves lead to failure of the protocol. With a min-entropy rate
R = RH + ε the minimal number of leaves in the tree is
√
12
n
22εn, thus the probability
of not failing the protocol is pguess = 2
−2εn. Comparing to pcheat (5.14) we see that
the probability of successfully cheating the protocol by risking is the same as the upper
bound of the probability of successful cheating of the protocol without risking.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to present a thorough review on protocols for device indepen-
dent randomness production. These protocols provide a principal qualitative advantage
in comparison with randomness generators based on classical physical phenomena, as
well as in comparison with protocols based on simple measurements of quantum states.
Randomness produced in a device independent way is certified by violation of some
Bell inequality. Such a violation guarantees that there is no deterministic model for the
observed correlations, which in turn guarantees that the outcomes of measurement were
not completely predetermined and therefore cannot be fully correlated to any outside
information. On the other hand, to certify violation of a Bell inequality randomness
is needed in the sense of “free will”, the possibility to choose measurement settings
independently to the outside world. Thus even device-independent protocols are not
able to produce randomness “out of nowhere”.
Different protocols described in our paper fundamentally depend on the level and
type of the accessible randomness. In general, with better starting randomness simpler
and more efficient protocols can be used, whereas in case where almost no randomness
is available, complicated protocols with many devices are necessary.
In all cases the general idea utilized in the protocols is the same. Available randomness
is used to select measurement settings in a Bell type experiment and the resulting data
are post-processed (possibly using part of the original data again) into almost perfect
randomness. This is defined as uniformly distributed bits that are uncorrelated to any
other information in the Universe.
Most of the protocols are technically rather simple and rely on measuring of few-
partite entangled states in one of a few pre-determined basis states. This is in a sharp
contradiction to most of other quantum protocols which rely on scaling of entanglement
range with scaling of the problem. So the crutial obstacle preventing from application
of device independent randomness generators is the lack of a cheap, reliable on-demand
source of multipartite entanglement and high efficiency detectors.
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